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ABSTRACT  
Rice is a staple food in Asia and its prices at national and international levels are largely influenced by 
different policy actions of trading countries. The consequence of the 2008 food crisis was food riots and 
rationing of rice in many nations. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) countries have adopted an institutional 
framework called ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserves (APTERR) to address food security 
concerns of ASEAN countries that may arise due to climate change, supply chain disruptions or price 
speculation in the regional rice market. The RICEFLOW model is used to study the effectiveness of the 
strategic grain reserves to mitigate rising rice prices in case of weather related calamities. The objective 
of the study is to address price volatility in the Philippines and other ASEAN countries due to production 
shortfalls. The simulated results from the RICEFLOW model show that the APTERR stocks are ideal to 
address short term emergency situations like disaster relief during floods and typhoons but are not 
sufficient under current design to address extreme price volatility. With increased commitment by member 
nations to the size of the APTERR grain reserves can offer a policy leverage to reduce extreme price 







I would like to thank Dr. Eric Wailes, Dr. Daniel Rainey, and Dr. Ka Zeng for all their help with dissertation. 
Also, special thanks to the faculty and staff at the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness 









TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) ............................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Political Economy of ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Countries ............................................. 3 
1.3 Challenges in ASEAN Plus Three (APT) as an Organization ............................................................. 7 
1.4 Need for ASEAN Plus Three (APT) .................................................................................................... 9 
1.41 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and Food Security ............................................................................. 10 
1.5 Price Volatility .................................................................................................................................... 12 
1.51 Measures of Volatility and Trends ............................................................................................... 13 
1.6 Impact of Volatile Agricultural Prices ................................................................................................ 13 
1.61 Impact of Price Volatility on Exporting and Importing Countries ................................................. 14 
1.62 Impact on Demand Side.............................................................................................................. 15 
1.63 Impact on Supply Side ................................................................................................................ 16 
1.7 Causes of Price Volatility .................................................................................................................. 17 
1.71 Commodity Speculation .............................................................................................................. 18 
1.72 Exchange Rate ............................................................................................................................ 18 
1.73 Demand for Bio-fuel Production and increase in International Oil Price ..................................... 19 
1.74 Farm Productivity and Investment in Agricultural Research ....................................................... 20 
1.8 Food Policy Options .......................................................................................................................... 20 
1.81 Trade Policy ................................................................................................................................ 21 
1.82 Futures Market ............................................................................................................................ 25 
1.83 Food Aid ...................................................................................................................................... 26 
1.84 Grain Reserves ........................................................................................................................... 27 
1.85 Objectives.................................................................................................................................... 29 
Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 30 
2.1 International Grain Reserves ............................................................................................................ 30 
2.11 Classification of Grain Reserves ................................................................................................. 30 
2.12 Regional Grain Reserves ............................................................................................................ 31 
2.13 Governance of Grain Reserves .................................................................................................. 33 
2.14. Opportunities of a Regional Grain Reserves ............................................................................. 34 
2.15 Challenges in Regional Grain Reserves ..................................................................................... 35 
2.2 Theoretical Framework of Grain Reserves ....................................................................................... 37 
2.21 Theory of Food Market Intervention ............................................................................................ 37 
2.22 Economics of Grain Reserve ...................................................................................................... 39 
 
2. 3 Past Experiences of Grain Reserves ............................................................................................... 41 
2.4 Political Economy of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Countries ............................................................... 42 
2.5 APT Cooperation in Agriculture and Food Security .......................................................................... 44 
2.6 ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) ............................................................... 46 
2.61 Management of the APTERR...................................................................................................... 46 
2.62 Challenges in having an Operational APTERR .......................................................................... 48 
Chapter 3 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................... 51 
3.1 The RICEFLOW Model ..................................................................................................................... 53 
3.2 Deterministic Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 54 
3.3 Stochastic Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 55 
3.4 Policy Scenario ................................................................................................................................. 56 
3.41 Deterministic Scenario ................................................................................................................ 56 
3.42 Stochastic Scenario .................................................................................................................... 57 
Chapter 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 60 
4.1 Deterministic Results ........................................................................................................................ 60 
4.11 Impact on Retail Price in Philippines ........................................................................................... 60 
4.12 Impact on Retail Prices in other ASEAN Countries .................................................................... 62 
4.13 Impact on Long Grain Rice Production in Member ASEAN Countries ....................................... 62 
4.14 Impact on Long Grain White Consumption in the Philippines ..................................................... 63 
4.15 Impact on Long Grain White Rice Consumption in selected ASEAN Countries. ........................ 64 
4.16 Impact on Imports of Long Grain White Rice in the Philippines .................................................. 64 
4.17 Impact on Long Grain White Rice Imports on selected ASEAN Countries ................................. 65 
4.2 Stochastic Results ............................................................................................................................. 66 
4.21 Impact on Retail Prices ............................................................................................................... 66 
4.22 Impact on Volume of Consumption ............................................................................................. 68 
4.23 Impact on Total Imports .............................................................................................................. 68 
4.3 Economic Analysis of the APTERR .................................................................................................. 68 
4.4 Political and Operational Challenges for Regional Grain Reserves ................................................. 71 
4.5 Challenges with Coordination of Grain Reserves ............................................................................. 72 
Chapter 5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................... 73 
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................................. 78 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 Per Capita Rice Consumption for APT Countries on Milled Equivalent in 2009 .......................... 1 
Table 1.2 Differences of Governance, Ethnicity, and Language in ASEAN Plus Three Countries .............. 7 
Table 1.3 Basic Economic Indicators for APT Countries for 2009 ................................................................ 9 
Table 1.4 Measures of Price Volatility and their Definitions ........................................................................ 13 
Table 1.5 Global Hunger Index from 1990 to 2012 for selected APT Countries ........................................ 16 
Table 1.6 Endogenous and Exogenous Components of Price Volatility .................................................... 17 
Table 1.7 Rice Production, Consumption, Imports and Exports in APT Countries for Year 2012 .............. 25 
Table 2.1 Different level of Co-operation in ASEAN Plus Three member (APT) Framework ..................... 43 
Table 2.2 ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserves Stocks in APT Countries in metric tons. .......... 47 
Table 2.3 Classification of the APTERR Tiers based on Purpose, Source and Beneficiary. ..................... 48 
Table 3.1 Salient Characteristics of the AGRM, IGRM and RICEFLOW Models. ...................................... 52 
Table 3.2 Product Distinction in RICEFLOW Model by Type and Degree of Milling .................................. 53 
Table 4.1 Impact on Long Grain Retail Prices in selected ASEAN countries ............................................. 62 
Table 4.2 Impact on Long Grain Rice Production in selected ASEAN countries ........................................ 63 
Table 4.3 Impact on Long Grain Rice Consumption in selected ASEAN countries .................................... 64 
Table 4.4 Change in Import of Long Grain White Rice in selected ASEAN countries ................................ 65 
Table 4.5 Percent change in Retail Price of Long Grain White Rice for selected ASEAN countries ......... 66 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 International Agricultural Commodity Prices (1998 – 2012) in Nominal Terms ........................... 3 
Figure 1.2 Components and Strategic Thrusts of ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework..... 4 
Figure 1.3 Undernourishment by Regions in Millions for Year 2009 .......................................................... 12 
Figure 1.4 Thai 100% B Price from June 2007 to December 2008 ............................................................ 23 
Figure 2.1 Food Market in absence of Government Intervention ............................................................... 38 
Figure 2.2 Food Market with Government Intervention .............................................................................. 39 
Figure 2.3 Economics of Grain Reserves ................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 2.4 Multi-layered Decision Making Structure of APT ....................................................................... 43 
Figure 2.5 APTERR Tiers and Type Payment Arrangement for Tiers ........................................................ 50 
Figure 3.1 RICEFLOW Model Schematics with Benchmark and Scenario ................................................ 54 
Figure 3.2 CDF of Stochastic Input for Philippines rice yield output based on differences between actual 
and stochastic means ................................................................................................................................. 56 
Figure 3.3 Benchmark variability of Paddy yield in the Philippines based on 100 Correlated Stochastic 
Yield Difference (1979 - 2009) .................................................................................................................... 57 
Figure 4.1 Change in Retail Prices of LGW rice in the Philippines without and with APTERR release ..... 61 
Figure 4.2 Change in Consumption of LGW rice in the Philippines without and with APTERR release .... 64 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ADB Asian Development Bank  
AERR ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve  
AIFS  ASEAN Integrated Food Security  
AMAF ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry 
AMF Asian Monetary Fund  
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation  
APT ASEAN Plus Three 
APTERR ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
CIGAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research  
DDR Doha Development Round  
EAEC East Asia Economic Caucus  
EAERR East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve 
EU European Union  
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GRiSP Global Rice Science Partnership  
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute 
IMF International Monetary Fund  
IRRI International Rice Research Institute  
LDC Least Developed Countries  
MGC Multinational Grain Companies  
MOAC Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives of Thailand 
MT- EAERR Management Team of the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement  
NFIDC Net Food Importing Countries  
OECD Organization for Economic Co‑operation and Development 
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation  
SDAC Southern African Development Community  
SEANWFZ Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization  
SOM Senior Official Meeting  
SPA-FS Strategic Plan of Action for Food Security  
STE State Trading Enterprise 
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation  
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UN-HLTF United Nations High Level Task Force 
WB World Bank  
WFP World Food Program 





Chapter 1  INTRODUCTION 
Rice is an important staple food to the Asian population; it is a source of food and income for the rural 
poor (Asia Society, 2010). In Asia, food security is often equated with availability as well as ability of poor 
consumers to purchase rice (table 1.1). Governments have historically intervened in their rice markets to 
ensure availability at affordable prices. Market interventions include price supports and price ceilings, 
export restrictions, input subsidies, and export and import tariffs (Wailes, 2005). 
Rice is consumed primarily where it is produced. This, along with the high levels of trade 
protection exercised by importing countries, result in a very thin international market. Moreover, exports 
are highly concentrated, with five countries (Thailand, Vietnam, India, Pakistan and the United States) 
accounting for roughly 80% of global trade over the last decade. One of the most important challenges 
facing Asian countries is the uncertainty and volatility of food prices especially with respect to rice. Most 
recently, the food price spike of 2008 sent tremors through Asian governments who became quickly 
vulnerable to a near tripling of the basic food staple. Even though responses to the crisis quelled the 
panic and lowered the international rice prices, it has taken a long time for prices to have reached the 
equilibrium to pre-2008 level (Dawe, 2010; Wong, 2010). To be specific, the price of rice as well as 
uncertainty of supply in international rice markets are the most important food security challenges facing 
Asian countries. These challenges provide an overarching opportunity to pursue policy innovation at 
national and regional levels to improve food security.  
Table 1.1 Per Capita Rice Consumption for APT Countries on Milled Equivalent in 2009 
Country kcal/capita/day 









South Korea 883 
Thailand 1323 
Vietnam 1390 
Source: FAO STAT, 2011  
Note: International average per capita calorie requirement is 2000 kcal /day 




In Asia, regional food security has become a major focus of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations1(ASEAN). Since 1996 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) (China, Japan, and South Korea) have worked 
to develop a framework to pursue regional rice food security. These efforts have not been particularly 
effective as witnessed by the events of the rice crisis in 2008. As demonstrated in 2008, the rice market is 
much more volatile than any other agricultural commodity market (figure 1.1). A large part of the rice price 
hike in 2008 is explained by market policy fundamentals, e.g., reactive government interventions in rice 
markets, but speculators are also to blame for such a hike in rice prices (Wong, 2010). The only policy 
option that was designed by ASEAN countries in response to the earlier price spike of 1974 was the East 
Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR). This was not effective in addressing 2008 price spike largely 
due to its weak institutional framework. Likewise, the limited success of emergency rice reserves to 
address pre 2008 food crises was due to lack of adequate volume and logistical constraints (Trethewie & 
Ewings, 2012). In the second chapter a discussion is presented on the history of grain reserves, and its 
role in addressing price volatility. 
In order to explore food policy options it is important to understand price volatility, its causes, and 
consequences. However, it is equally important to understand the regional policy framework and 
organization where regional food policies are developed and implemented. The next section offers a 
description on the political economy of ASEAN Plus Three (APT).  
1.1 ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional geo-political and economic 
organization established on 8th August 1967 with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand being its founding members. The organization has expanded to include Brunei, Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Since 1996 China, Japan, and South Korea have joined ASEAN countries 
to form the APT framework. An in depth discussion on APT organizational structure, decision making and 
its role in promoting food security is presented in Chapter 2.  
 
                                                          
1ASEAN Countries: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, 




Figure 1.1 International Agricultural Commodity Prices (1998 – 2012) in Nominal Terms 
 
 
In response to the 2007-2008 global rise in food prices APT members have undertaken a series of 
strategies and formulated policies that would stabilize rice prices for ASEAN economies. In 2009, ASEAN 
member countries adopted a regional food security strategy: ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) has 
a Strategic Plan of Action for Food Security (SPA-FS) (ADB, 2009).The SPA-FS objectives are to address 
food security issues in APT countries. Based on the 14th ASEAN summit in Chaam, Thailand the AIFS 
framework working document2 on food security, there are four strategic objectives to achieve food 
security in ASEAN countries:1) enhance trade in rice, 2) manage a regional buffer stock (Emergency Rice 
Reserve), 3) enhance food security information, and 4) promote agricultural innovation and sustainable 
food production. These objectives are inter-related and address the food security concerns of ASEAN 
countries (see figure 1.2). 
1.2 Political Economy of ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Countries 
Southeast Asia in the absence of any superpowers influence has successfully established several 
regional organizations (ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three, ASEM, AFTA) that have structures and procedures 
that incorporate Southeast Asian preferences (Simon, 2008). 
                                                          



















































































































Figure 1.2 Components and Strategic Thrusts of ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework 
 
Regionalism is shaped by different elements such as the location, local cultures, religious beliefs, and 
social norms which define relations of member states within the organization (Stubbs, 2008). The regional 
ideology of ASEAN on ways and means to address international and regional relations is shaped by a 
series of historical events starting with colonialism followed by the Cold War and later globalization 
(Jetschke & Ruland, 2007; Stubbs, 2005). The idea of South East Asian regionalism can be better 
understood if we take into account under what circumstances the regional organizations came into 
existence and what possible future these organizations can have in addressing the regional food security. 
In 1976, the ASEAN organization started with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand 
to address two important events in South East Asia (Stubbs, 2008). First, it was organized to settle the 
border dispute confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Second, it was developed to counter the 
spread of communism in South East Asia. Therefore in 1967 the famous Bangkok declaration was made 
with the objective of achieving a spirit of “equality and partnership” for peace, freedom, social justice, and 
economic well-being and to prevent the subversion of national independence and development (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 1967). Likewise, according to Stubbs (2002) other events such as economic progress due to 




US and Japan offered a stable environment to develop other subsequent regional agreements. These 
included the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)3  in 1971, the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation4 (TAC) in 1967, and the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone5 (SEANWFZ) in 1997 
to foster the non-communist Asian countries towards a successful regional organization (Stubbs, 2002). 
The idea of developing a neutral bloc or an indigenous alternative to the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization6 (SEATO) (Kaushik, 1975, Acharya, 2005a) led to the Bandung (Indonesia) conference that 
stipulated relations between countries must be based on the values and interests of the members and 
that there should be no use of force to change the regime (Acharya, 2005a). The Bandung conference 
concluded that all member disputes in ASEAN should be solved by consultation, consensus, and 
compromise by adopting informal and non-confrontational ways (Acharya 2005b; Mackie 2005). In 
Southeast Asia “malaya culture” believes in the practice of consultation, and consensus, important 
regional norms that have been embedded into the ASEAN organization (Acharya, 2001, p 63-70; 
Jetschke & Ruland, 2009). This approach is often called as the “ASEAN Way” (Stubbs, 2008; Dosch, 
2008). The same approach has dominated the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 
East Asian Summit and APEC meetings (Stubbs, 2005).The South Korean initiative in 1970 on an Asian 
Common Market followed with the formation of the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), which was the 
forerunner of the APT movement (Stubbs, 2002). Later in 1997, APT was informally adopted as a 
regional organization by ASEAN (asean.org). The APT as a framework or forum has East Asian 
characteristics that place a premium on family, community, social harmony, duty, and respect for 
hierarchy and authority (Pye, 1985). Capitalism employed in the majority of the APT economies is not 
based much on the rule of law but more on social obligation and trust (Hamilton, 1991). The operational 
difference between APT and other regional organizations such as North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and European Union (EU), as elaborated by Pye (1985) and Hamilton (1991), makes 
                                                          
3Signed by ASEAN foreign Ministers in 1971 to keep ASEAN member nations free from Cold War rivalry 
and enhance cooperation among ASEAN members. 
4Signed by ASEAN founding members at the First ASEAN Meeting in 1967 also called the Bali Treaty 
(Jones & Smith, 2007). 
5Signed in 1997 by ASEAN members to make ASEAN region free from nuclear weapons also called as 
the Bangkok Treaty. 
6SEATO was formed in 1954 following the formation of NATO in South Asia included the United States, 




operational understanding on working of the APT quite complex. Although APT members have a long 
history of political differences they share a common cultural trait that can be identified as the binding force 
of the organization (Stubbs, 2002). The ASEAN paradigm is about respect for each member state: an 
indigenous approach to solve conflicts by adapting western global norms that can accommodate local 
norms and identities (Acharya, 2004).The rigidity in ASEAN as an organization is based on the fact that 
goals and norms to conduct inter and intra organizational relations is grounded in the Asian culture and 
history. The historical assessment of Asian political economy made by Myrdal (1968) states that Asian 
countries have emphasis on settling disputes peacefully and by mutual agreement. Therefore, ASEAN 
countries have maintained the same philosophy as their guiding principle to settle disputes. To further 
strengthen Myrdal’s (1968) argument policies in South Asia are often regarded as piecemeal or 
gradualist, therefore any democratic planning with reliance on persuasion is not effective. Therefore, no 
matter how passionate or radical the social and economic reforms, there is largely a cautious approach at 
large (Myrdal 1968). In Asia, at the micro level there is origin of heterogeneity or confusion over oneness 
and individuals have a competing and conflicting opinion on traditional and modern ideas (Myrdal, 1971). 
At the macro level South Asia is not nationally consolidated, there are groups of people within as well as 
among countries demanding autonomy (Myrdal, 1968). To conclude, Myrdal’s (1968) analysis states that 
South Asian states are “soft states” and policies that are decided are not enforced and even if any 
policies are enacted there is no obligation place on people7 . The ASEAN countries represent a mosaic of 
multiethnic communities within a group of nations. The concept of Asian Culture explains the inherent 
difference between countries in their approach to any specific issue. The difference in culture is better 
explained by the ASEAN approach to human rights. The Asian culture argument made by Jones and 
Acharya (1995) places importance on collective rights and not on individual rights in the ASEAN 
countries. The emphasis on community welfare as argued by Acharya (1995) states that economic 
prosperity is achieved in a stable political environment outweighs individual human rights especially in a 
highly multiethnic Southeast Asian society. The ASEAN position on human rights gives us an idea that 
there are different interpretations of cultural norms within ASEAN countries (Jones, 1993). The human 
                                                          




rights values of Islamic nations like Indonesia and Malaysia differ from Catholic Philippines, or Buddhist 
Thailand or Confucian Singapore (Acharya, 1995). The concept of ASEAN culture is exploited by ASEAN 
members to their political advantage when its suits their interests (Acharya, 1995). In case of APT 
countries, China has successfully used Confucian values to its advantage; first abandoning it when the 
idea was an obstacle in modernizing of country and embracing it when there is assessment of human 
rights by international media (Acharya, 1995). 
1.3 Challenges in ASEAN Plus Three (APT) as an Organization  
There is immense heterogeneity among countries as well as within countries in Southeast Asia with 
respect to its culture (Myrdal 1971).The APT members give the impression of having a common Asian 
culture. But, all member nations are quite distinct in their history, language, political and social 
environment (table 1.2). 
Table 1.2 Differences of Governance, Ethnicity, and Language in ASEAN Plus Three Countries. 
Country 




Type of Government 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
Malay* Malay Muslim  
Constitutional Islamic Monarchy 
Cambodia 









Indonesia Bahasa Indonesia* Javanese Muslim Republic 
Japan 
Japanese Japanese Shintoism Parliamentary Government with 
a Constitutional Monarchy 
Lao PDR Lao* Lao Buddhist Communist state 
Malaysia Bahasa Malaysia* Malay Muslim Constitutional Monarchy 
Myanmar Burmese* Burman Buddhist Military Regime 
Philippines 











Korean  Christianity 
Republic 
Thailand Thai Thai Buddhist Constitutional Monarchy 
Vietnam Vietnamese* Kinh Atheist Communist State 
Source: CIA Fact book, 2011 *Official Language 
 
Based on Stubbs’ (2002) assessment there are five major reasons that can obstruct the rise of the APT 
as a regional force. First, within APT members there is growing sentiment of nationalism. In the absence 




countries like the Philippines and Indonesia are focusing more on national self-sufficiency with domestic 
production of rice rather than relying on the imports from member ASEAN countries. Second, there are 
other major domestic issues such lack of proper governance, excessive corruption and poverty 
hampering individual APT members so there is less time and resources devoted to the APT issues as 
part of the common regional foreign policy. Third, regional rivalry for leadership between Japan and China 
or economic disparity between the APT member countries such as between Singapore and Cambodia 
can create different interests for members within the APT (Stubbs, 2008). Fourth, increases in bilateral 
trade agreements between the APT members and the non-APT members have challenged the APT’s 
leadership as a regional trade organization. Individual trade agreements of APT members with non APT 
members undermine the role of APT as an economic union that promotes free trade in Asia.  Fifth, the 
external pressures from superpowers such as the US have reservations that the APT as a regional 
trading organization would seriously undermine the US goals and ambitions in promoting the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC8) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore, based on Jones’ 
(2010) assessment, ASEAN is often branded as an organization that is ineffective when it comes to 
taking action as in the case of the Asian economic crises of 1997 and the transnational security threat. 
The ASEAN belief of non-interference into the matters of the member states as argued by Acharya as the 
“ASEAN Way” in reality has made the organization counterproductive. To elaborate the policy responses 
of ASEAN to events of humanitarian crises in Myanmar and East Timor are deeply disturbing as ASEAN 
policy of non-interference has severely undermined the effectiveness of the organization (Jones 2010). 
According to Moller (1998) without interference the organization can be meaningless. Therefore, Stubbs’ 
(2002, 2008) assessments on the ASEAN role or contribution in regional and international diplomacy is 
that it has been very marginal due to the original mandate of non-interference that makes member states 
ineffective in addressing regional and global issues. Finally, Jones (2011) concludes that the ASEAN 
policy of non-interference is not sustainable and needs to change over time to accommodate social and 
economic changes in the international environment. The ASEAN member states are very strategic in 
marginalizing regional interests and agendas that do not promote their vested self interest in the 
                                                          
8Asia-Pacific  Economic Cooperation (APEC) consist of Thailand, United States, Indonesia, Australia, 
Brunei Darussalam, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, China, New Zealand, 




organization (Jessop, 2008). There is evidence (see details in Jones, 2010) where member states have 
interfered into the domestic affairs of other member states since the start of Cold War up to the recent 
humanitarian crises in East Timor and Myanmar. Likewise, a series of events since 1997 such as 
economic crises, loss of FDI in ASEAN members, and a standby approach to the autocratic rule in 
Myanmar have weakened credibility of the ASEAN. The recent ASEAN initiative to add South Korea, 
Japan and China to form the APT has generated or renewed the credibility of the organization at the 
regional level. Despite its domestic problems, ASEAN has an impressive commitment in binding its 
members to non ASEAN members in different regional agreements (Simon, 2008). 
Table 1.3 Basic Economic Indicators for APT Countries for 2009 
ASEAN Countries Total Land Area Total 
Population 
Gross Domestic 




   at current prices 
 Km2 (1000) USD Million USD 
Brunei Darussalam 5,765            399  NA NA 
Cambodia 181,035      14,139  112,423 795 
Indonesia 1,860,360    239,870  7,065,582 2,946 
Laos PDR 236,800         6,201  72,964 1,177 
Malaysia 330,252      28,401  2,377,969 8,373 
Myanmar (Burma) 676,577      47,963   NA NA 
Philippines 300,000      93,261  1,995,894 2,140 
Singapore 710         5,077  2,087,650 41,120 
Thailand 513,120      69,122  3,185,223 4,608 




               -        
China 9,596,961 1,338,300 59,266,120 4,428 
Japan 377,915    127,451  54,588,367 42,831 
South Korea 99,720      48,875  10,144,832 20,757 
Source: ASEAN Finance and Macro-economic Surveillance Unit Database, 2009,1CIA, 2012. 
 
1.4 Need for ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
The need for APT is because ASEAN on its own could not muster the economic or political will to act as a 
regional body to address its food security concerns. Despite the current territorial dispute in South China 
Sea between ASEAN and plus three countries. ASEAN as an organization needs assistance of plus three 
countries to address its food security needs as plus three countries have adequate financial resources to 
support broad objectives of food security as outlined in figure 1.1. South Korea, China and Japan 
combined have a GDP seven times as that of all ASEAN countries (table 1.3) The ASEAN organization in 




countries that have challenged the organization to be more reformist. Furthermore, the rise of civil 
societies and legislative reforms at the domestic levels in member countries have forced the ASEAN 
leadership to take a responsible role in addressing ASEANs’ foreign policy (Jones, 2009; Ruland 2009). 
APT can be one of the largest food security agreement in terms of its membership to represent trade 
interests of south Asian countries in the WTO. APEC and the ASEAN are the two key southeast regional 
organizations that can compete for the regional leadership but both these organization have their own 
limitations. In case of the APEC, it is a trans-regional body rather than a regional body (Ravenhill, 2000). 
Likewise other factors that make the APEC less appealing in terms of providing leadership for southeast 
Asia are first, the distinction between Asian9 and Anglo-American10 economies on the pace and priorities 
of trade liberalization within APEC economies (Stubbs, 2002). Second, as the size of APEC has 
increased from, 12 to 23 members, it is more difficult to reach consensus (Stubbs, 2002). Unlike APEC, 
ASEAN has also increased its membership to Indo-China11 countries and with new members such as 
Vietnam and Myanmar has continued to insist on keeping the status quo principle of non-interference 
(Simon, 2008). The founding ASEAN members want to get involved in the affairs of other member states 
via flexible engagement or constructive intervention (Stubbs, 2002). Therefore, to counter both arguments 
the APT can be viewed as an attempt to foster East Asian cooperation and leadership to address regional 
and international issues which the APEC and the ASEAN have failed to address in the past. 
1.41 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and Food Security  
Rice is an important source of employment, income and nutrition in the APT countries (FAO, 2009a). 
Likewise, the structure of rice farming in the APT region consists of a large number of small farmers. 
Therefore, any drop in rice prices at the producer level has a serious welfare consequence for farm 
households and the rural poor thereby causing economic hardship, and ultimately leading to food 
insecure households (FAO, 2009a) (figure 1.3). Likewise, sharp increases in rice prices have an 
especially devastating impact on the welfare of poor urban households. During the past decade, 
                                                          
9 Asian Economies (China and Malaysia) in APEC had priority for trade liberalization in form of economic 
and technical cooperation on trade facilitation. 
10 Anglo American Economies (Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the U.S) had priority on binding 
target for trade liberalization. 




economic reforms such as trade liberalization and rapid Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the APT 
countries resulted in economic growth but, some of the other consequences of economic reforms were 
unintended such as increased inflation of food prices resulting in hunger and malnutrition. The price spike 
of 2008 was not due to a lack of adequate supplies of rice but rather to the lack of purchasing power and 
reactionary policies by uninformed policy decision-makers (FAO, 2009a). In other words, the structure of 
a political and economic regime12 provides a better explanation for poverty such as economic inequality 
or capitalism (Stone, 1989). A lack of market reforms (towards capitalism) in Asia is the structural cause 
as well as historical cause for poverty and food insecurity. Based on Gilbert’s (2008) analysis of 
agricultural trade reforms in Asia and Pacific countries, only comprehensive trade reforms can 
consistently lower poverty in the Asia and Pacific region.  In Asia, a majority of governments in the APT 
countries are sandwiched between socialist and capitalist forms of governance. The governing structure 
often fails to solve the majority of problems and in the words of Stone (1989) “People who are victimized 
by a problem do not seek political change because they do not see the problem as changeable, do not 
believe they could bring about change, and need the material resources for survival provided by the 
status quo” (p. 288). Therefore, citizens in either regime, democratic or communist are less interested in 
any policy change as long as their governments are able to provide rice at affordable prices either 
through a State Trading Enterprise (STE) or private enterprise irrespective of any policy reforms. 
Therefore, the APT countries regardless of the type of governance (table 1.2) will be interested in policy 
options such as free trade, futures markets and grains reserves as long as it addresses their food security 
concerns during emergency situations like floods or droughts. In response to the 2008 food crisis, 
worldwide and national efforts in developing strategies aimed at mitigating the volatility of the rice market 
are being pursued. For example, international agencies, such as the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI) under the Global Rice Science Partnership (GRiSP) has accelerated funding of programs to 
increase rice productivity and promote sustainable rice farming (www.irri.org). Financial institutes like the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB) have made commitments to increase their funding 
for infrastructure development for efficient rice supply chains (Reardon, Chen, Minten, & Adriano, 2012). 
Likewise, the World Food Program (WFP) has renewed its commitment for emergency food relief even 
                                                          




under the constraint budget (WFP, 2008) Furthermore, increasing concerns about the potential impact of 
climate change and resource constraints on the volatility of the rice market are also raising concerns and 
have resulted in mobilizing resources among agents involved in the rice market to come up with 
innovative plans of actions to minimize food price volatility. 
Figure 1.3 Undernourishment by Regions in Millions for Year 2009 
 
1.5 Price Volatility 
 
The term price volatility refers to the variability in price. Based on Gilbert’s (2011) argument of asymmetry, 
when prices are higher they are more volatile. The argument is supported by the logic of limited inventory. 
As higher prices are typically more volatile and when there is less inventory and deficit production, prices 
will rise and available inventory will be used only to the extent of exhaustion to meet the positive demand 
or production shortfall thereby cumulatively adding to increased price volatility (Gilbert & Morgan, 2010; 
Gilbert 2011). Prakash (2011) using time series analysis and the storage model argument found that 
commodity prices have asymmetrical distributions and based on similar data Pfaffenzeller, Newbold, & 
Rayner (2007) concluded that annual rice prices have a negative kurtosis13 coefficient and a positive 
skewness14 coefficient. For policy makers it is imperative to understand why and how to curb the price 
volatility in commodity markets.  
                                                          
13 Kurtosis measures if the data points are peaked or flat when compared to a normal distribution. 
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1.51 Measures of Volatility and Trends 
There are different measures of volatility and trends. The empirical measure of price volatility is the 
standard deviation of a price or the coefficient of variation. To elaborate Moledina, Roe, & Shane (2004) 
used standard deviation, deviation from trend, unconditional standard deviation, and conditional standard 
deviation to assess commodity price volatility.  
Table 1.4 Measures of Price Volatility and their Definitions 
Measure of Volatility Definition 
Standard Deviation (SD) Variation from the average or mean 
Standard Deviation from Trend (SDT) Variation from the average or mean from the trend 
Unconditional Standard Deviation (USD) Variation from the average or mean for a given 
time period does not take into account predictable 
and unpredictable elements of change 
Conditional Standard Deviation (CSD) Variation from the average or mean for a given 
time period taking into account predictable 
(seasonality) and unpredictable elements of 
change 
Source: Moledina et al., 2004 
 
The objective of Moledina et al. (2004) study was to identify different measure of volatility and quantify 
welfare of government price stabilization programs that addressed price volatility. Irrespective of how we 
measure agricultural price volatility it is quite interesting to see that price spike events have happened in 
the past and represent a similar pattern of instant rise in prices for few months followed by gradual fall in 
prices. Moledina et al., (2004) using standard deviation as a measure of volatility, found that oil markets 
were the most volatile of all commodities. However, if the conditional standard deviation measure was 
used then rice prices in Thailand are the most volatile of all the commodities. The prices are more volatile 
when evaluated on the month to month basis rather than on yearly basis as presented in appendix figures 
1.0, 2.0, and 3.0. Based on a study by Headey and Fan (2008) the price level ( in real terms) of 
agricultural commodities during 2008 was as high as the pervious price spike of 1973 or late 1980s and in 
case of the rice the percent change in price from 1970 to 1974 and from 2004 to 2008 was 200 and 255 
percent respectively. Furthermore, price movements during both of these time periods were sudden 
therefore the use of the term “volatile” is appropriate to represent the phenomenon. 
 





The impact of highly volatile prices is at two levels; at the microeconomic (household or individual) level 
there is an increase in the uncertain cost of living for a poor  household which spends a major share of his 
household income on food. At the macroeconomic level there is a huge economic cost to governments 
that address volatile price via costly state intervention programs (Headey & Fan, 2008). To understand 
the impact of high volatile prices the impact must be disaggregated at different levels of the economy as 
summarized in Food Agriculture Organization (FAO)15, (2011) comprehensive report. 
1.61 Impact of Price Volatility on Exporting and Importing Countries 
In the case of an exporting country (developing or emerging economy) if there is sudden drop in the 
prices of agricultural commodities there will be loss of revenues and decline in future investment in 
agriculture that will ultimately jeopardize long term growth of the agriculture sector. Based of Yu, Tokgoz, 
Wailes, and Chavez (2011) estimates in 2007-2008 international reference price of rice increased by 88 
USD per Mt (24 percent), and net trade declined by 1.6 million Mt (5 percent). They argue that rice export 
bans in 2007 and 2008 by China, India, Vietnam, Pakistan and Egypt resulted in significant loss to 
exporters in respective countries, however a positive external impact was realized by exporters who did 
not limit their exports (such as the United States). On the other hand, extremely higher prices drain 
valuable foreign exchange and deteriorate public finances of a food deficit developing country that is 
reliant on imports to meet its food security needs (FAO et al., 2011). In 2007 and 2008, developing 
countries experienced overall increase in weighted average price of rice by 7.9 percent with price 
increases of 23.2 percent in countries with no policy intervention (Yu et al., 2011).  In case of low income 
countries, inflation in food prices leads to more exports of basic raw materials (mineral resources often 
low in value ) in order to finance costly food imports there by creating budget deficits (FAO et al., 2011). 
Such deficits lead to the depreciation of a country’s currency. Furthermore as an importing country 
decreases tariffs to reduce the costs of imports and stabilize prices there is considerable loss of 
government revenue from tariffs and taxes on foods which cumulatively increases government borrowing. 
                                                          
15 Other organizations that contributed to the comprehensive report are International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Co‑operation and 
Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Food 
Program (WFP), the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Food Policy 




Based on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008) analysis in general whenever government public 
finances are used to address rising food prices by eliminating taxes and subsidies there is one percent 
increase in budget deficit. 
1.62 Impact on Demand Side  
According to Von Braun (2008) poor people spend about half to three fourths of their income on food. An 
event like a sudden spike in food prices as witnessed in 2008 has led millions into starvation in the short 
term and in the long term absence of nutritious foods leads to stunted growth in children and lack of 
mental development in the fetuses of pregnant women (FAO et al., 2011). The socio economic impact 
according to FAO et al., (2011) due to lack of food for children, is loss of a generation as children are 
forced to work rather than attend school. The impact of rising food prices has different impacts for 
different countries and is largely seen in low income households of every society. Developing countries in 
Asia Pacific, at the poorest household level spend about 60 to 70 percent16 of their total budget on food 
items (Anderson, Jha, Nelgen, & Strutt, 2012). In case of rice, rural17 and urban poor household 
expenditures on rice alone is about 25 to 40 percent (Dawe 2000; Timmer, Block, & Dawe, 2010; Dawe & 
Timmer, 2012). These impacts of volatile prices are not only limited to low income countries but also 
extend to middle income18 countries where the poorer consumers spend about half of their income on 
food and thereby experience food price inflation. Similarly, low income19 individuals in the developed 
countries suffer economic hardship where a large portion of their income is spent on food items. Based 
on FAO estimates over the period from 2007 to 2009 the number of hungry people worldwide increased 
from 820 million to one billion (FAO et al., 2011). In APT countries the 2011 status of the food security is 
explained with use of the concept of the Global Hunger Index (GHI). Table 1.5 lists selected APT 
countries with respect to the Global Hunger Index (GHI)20. The GHI is stated in percentage, and is an 
                                                          
16 Household per capita consumption per day calculated on $1.25 at 2005 Purchasing Power Parity. 
17 Rural household expenditure on rice that grows other crops than rice is about 25 to 40 percent.  
18See appendix table 1.0  
19 Middle Income Country ($1026 to $12,475) See appendix table 1.0 APT Classification based on World 
Bank Report, 2011.  
20 Index Interpretation GHI: 0 to 4.9 is low, 5 to 9.9 is moderate, 10 to 19.9 is serious, 20.0 to 29.9 is 




equal composite of three indicators; the proportion of undernourished in the population, the prevalence of 
underweight children under the age of five years, and the mortality rate of children under five years. 
Table 1.5 Global Hunger Index from 1990 to 2012 for selected APT Countries. 
Country 1990 1996 2001 2011            2012 
Cambodia 31.8 31.5 26.0 19.9 19.6 
Indonesia 18.5 15.4 14.2 12.2 12.0 
Lao PDR 28.6 25.2 23.6 20.2 19.7 
Malaysia 9.0 6.7 6.6 <5 5.2 
Myanmar NA NA NA 16.3 NA 
Philippines 19.9 17.6 14.2 11.5 12.2 
Thailand 15.1 11.8 9.2 8.1 8.1 
Vietnam 25.6 21.4 15.5 11.2 11.2 
China 11.8 8.9 6.7 5.5 5.1 
Source: Von Grebmer et al. 2011, 2012. 
 
In a majority of the ASEAN countries like Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Philippines and 
Vietnam the GHI is are above 10 percent. The ADB (2012) estimated21 that there would more than 64 
million people in poverty due to 10 percent increase in domestic food price. The food price volatility have 
detrimental impacts on small farmers who often are net buyers of food as they consume more that they 
produce (FAO 2010, ADB 2012). In case of small farmers volatile prices can reduce their disposable 
income and in worst case may lead to selling off their assets or children dropping out of school in the 
short term and would be pushed into poverty in long term (ADB, 2012). 
1.63 Impact on Supply Side  
Based on a study by FAO et al., (2011) the impact of increases of food prices on the supply side are 
summarized as follows. Increases in food prices definitely benefits producers but it increases costs of 
feed and feedstock for the producers of livestock and biofuel sectors. If these sectors are unable to pass 
the price pressures on to consumers they are likely to go bankrupt, the consequences of such events are 
detrimental to the long term growth of livestock, dairy and bio-fuel industries. On the other hand, low and 
volatile prices impact farmers and other supply chain intermediaries where farmers’ expected return on 
investment are not recovered. Small farmers in developing countries are unable to cope with low and 
volatile prices and find it hard to stay in business as there is no easy availability of credit for future 
planting. Most small farmers in Asia use income from one season to finance the agricultural operations for 
                                                          




the next season. The ultimate result of the excessive price volatility on the farming community is that the 
overall welfare of the family and the economic viability of farm is in danger. In developing countries, in 
some cases where markets are already malfunctioning, price volatility make farmers risk averse and 
creates an environment in which there is lack of productive investment in agriculture (ADB, 2012). Price 
volatility has a significant impact on productivity and human development; volatile prices create 
uncertainty in the food supply chain as a result of which both producers and consumers do not invest in 
assets for the long term and tend to have savings in more liquid assets (Timmer 1997, ADB 2012). 
1.7 Causes of Price Volatility 
 
In general agricultural commodities are volatile due to three different market fundamentals as 
summarized by FAO et al., (2011): first, agricultural output varies and is dependent on weather and pests. 
Second, when stocks are low, the elasticity of demand with respect to price as well as supply elasticities 
are low so there is a time lapse to get supply to respond to the persistent demand and therefore prices 
adjust to ration limited supplies. Third, there is always a lag period between supply and change in price in 
the short term that further contributes to increased volatility in the markets. The macro and micro 
components of the price volatility in agricultural commodities are summarized in table 1.6. Some of the 
identified causes of the price volatility are as follow. 
Table 1.6 Endogenous and Exogenous Components of Price Volatility 
 Endogenous Agents Exogenous Agents 
Increased Price Volatility 1.Trade barrier (export 
restrictions and ban on imports) 




Decreased Price Volatility 1.Government Intervention 
in commodity market 
2.No restriction on imports 
Imperfect competition and 
institutions to hedge price risk 
(incomplete markets) 
Source: Adapted from Moledina et al. 2004 p.3 
 
Based on Timmer’s (2010a) argument rice prices in most Asian countries are volatile due the structure of 
rice production, marketing and consumption. The structure of Asian rice market as stated by Timmer 
(2010b) has millions of small farmers, supply chain intermediaries and billions of consumers and traders, 
processors and retailers that store and handle rice. He argues that it is difficult to gather data on price 
expectation of all these market participants making rice market information highly incomplete and 




1.71 Commodity Speculation 
The organized commodity exchanges provide a market for trading of commodities where participants 
such as hedgers seek to manage risk and speculators seek to profit from risk taking. However based on 
Gilbert’s (2009) assessment there is a weak link to establish if the commodity markets have caused 
commodity prices to be more volatile. The price spike in rice markets is not new, in past 40 years there 
were four such events, but only the price spike of 1973 - 1975 is close in magnitude to the 2008 price 
spike (Sarris, 2010). As rice is not traded much on the commodity market, rice futures are not the likely 
cause of 2008 sudden rise in the rice prices (Sarris, 2010). In response to the extreme price volatility of 
2008 policy makers are exploring different policy options in ASEAN countries. The use of futures market 
at the regional level is one of the options suggested by some organizations like IRRI and Asia Society 
(Mohanty, 2012; Asia Society, 2010). However, McKenzie (2012) and Hamilton (2012) conclude that, rice 
futures in ASEAN are not the solution for addressing price volatility. As hoarding tendencies of traders 
and middlemen, and antitrade policies adopted by the governments have definitely contributed to the rise 
in rice prices (Dawe, 2010). The trigger for the price spike of rice in 2007 -2008 was individualistic 
behavior of governments in India, Vietnam, and Egypt that banned exports and created a panic in the rice 
markets within a limited period of time (Sarris, 2010). Therefore, commodity speculation by rice market 
participants such as traders, middlemen and governments in developing countries has contributed to 
immediate rise in rice prices in 2007-2008.  
1.72 Exchange Rate 
The majority of international transactions in agricultural commodities are executed in terms of the US 
dollars. The role of the US dollar in the international rice trade had contributed to the price spike of 2007-
2008. As per the FAO estimate an increase of 3.5 percent in the global prices of a commodity is expected 
with 10 percent depreciation of the US dollar against all currencies holding all other things constant 
(Sarris, 2010). Also, Headey and Fan (2008) confirmed that depreciation of the US dollar led to increase 
in nominal price of the key staples (dollar denominated food prices) by about 25 percent if measured in 





1.73 Demand for Bio-fuel Production and increase in International Oil Price 
Rice is not an important biofuel stock. So there is no direct impact of biofuel production on rice prices 
however, there are indirect impacts on its prices via demand substitution effects (Sarris, 2010).There is a 
close link between the price of oil and agricultural commodities. Based on Natanelov, V., Alam, M. J., 
McKenzie, A. M., & Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2011) analysis there is co-movement of well-established, 
mature commodity futures market and oil prices in long term. In ASEAN countries increases in the price of 
oil results in increases in the cost of fertilizer and energy needed for the rice production. According to 
Cudao and Gracias (2005) the impact of a change in oil price on the ASEAN countries was concluded 
that oil price shocks have a significant impact on inflation and the overall economy of all ASEAN countries 
when estimated in local currency units. Based on Rosegrant's (2008) assessment different factors have 
contributed to the rapid rise in the price of commodities in international grain markets, and the mandate 
on the use of biofuels in the US and EU is one of them. A majority of analysts (Boonekamp, 2008; Collins, 
2008; Yacobucci & Schnepf 2007;) have concluded that increased biofuel production was the major 
cause for the rise in price of major commodities. In the case of rice Rosegrant’s (2008) IFPRI study on 
biofuels concluded that about 21 percent of the total price rise in rice was indirectly due to biofuels. 
Although, rice is not the primary feedstock in production of biofuels but increases in the price of other 
commodities have contributed to the increase in price of rice (de Gorter, 2008). Based on Elliot’s (2008) 
comprehensive assessment the immediate rise in rice prices in 2008 cannot be easily identified as the 
linkage to biofuel demand for several reasons, first agro climatic condition where rice is grown is not 
suitable for production of corn therefore there is no change in acreage from rice to corn production with 
exception of southern US and China. Second, there is no large change in consumption of other grains 
when compared to rice (except in India22 and Africa). Third, rice consumption as a percent of daily 
calories consumed in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America is about 84, 8, and 9 percent 
respectively and corn consumption in Asia and combined Latin America and Africa is about 7 and 15 
percent respectively. Therefore, role of corn in biofuels production and its impact on rice supply is not that 
large.  
                                                          




1.74 Farm Productivity and Investment in Agricultural Research  
There has been a decrease in the rate of investment in agricultural research at public agricultural 
institutes that have historically contributed to increased agricultural production. As agricultural research 
funding has been reduced, there has been a decrease in agricultural productivity in Asia from the early 
1990-1999 to 2000-2006 (Sarris, 2010). There is clear evidence from GRiSP (2013) that as investment in 
funding agricultural research increases at the institutional level there is a decrease in poverty and an 
increase in the affordability of rice. In response to global higher food prices of 2007-2008 there is an 
ongoing discussion among the donor communities about how, when and for what purposes there is going 
to be future expansion of public funding for research (Asia Society, 2010).  
1.8 Food Policy Options 
 
Based on FAO estimates in the period from 2007 to 2009 the number people hungry worldwide increased 
from 820 million to one billion primarily as a result of higher food prices (FAO et al., 2011). To address the 
food price spike of 2007-2008 collaborative efforts among nations are being pursued at national and 
international levels. International institutes, intergovernmental and national governments have outlined 
some options to address price volatility in the near future. A series of policy instruments can be deployed 
at the national and the international levels either as a direct intervention through trade policy reforms and 
risk management institutions with intergovernmental stocks or indirect intervention with “virtual stocks23” 
at organized commodity exchanges (Sarris, 2010). As per Wiggins and Keats (2010) a list of eleven 
current proposals that have been put forward are grouped as follow:  
A. Grain Reserves 
1. Emergency Reserve 
2. International Grain Reserve 
3. Regional Grain Reserves and National Grain Reserves 
B. Virtual and Para Reserves 
 1. Virtual Reserve 
                                                          
23 Virtual stocks are commitment of financial resources by a group of countries to address speculation in 




 2. Ban on food grains used in livestock or biofuel production 
C. Information System Development and Coordination 
 1. Information system on storage 
 2. International coordination of information on food security 
D. Trade Policy Response 
 1. International Grain Clearance  
 2. Prevention of export ban 
 3. Financing of food imports 
E. Production Reserves  
Price volatility is not new to agricultural markets and neither are the solutions, many of the policy solution 
recommendations to 2007-2008 price spike are not new and there is a prior knowledge of which policy 
solutions work (Tangermann, 2011). Some of the most widely discussed policy solutions that can be 
explored again are discussed below. 
1.81 Trade Policy 
In Asia there is a wide contrast in the ASEAN region with respect to supply and demand of rice; Thailand 
and Vietnam are the largest exporters of rice, while Philippines and Indonesia are the largest importers of 
rice (Asia Society, 2010) (table 1.7) In order to equate or balance supply and demand there should be 
enhanced trade among these countries within the ASEAN region. ASEAN countries are better equipped 
to meet their food security needs than any other group of countries as the ASEAN regional trade 
agreement incorporates both the worlds’ largest exporters as well as importers within the region 
(appendix table 2.0). A recent study by Bello (2005) on ASEAN regional integration indicated that there is 
adequate rice for consumption in ASEAN countries to meet its food security needs if there is free trade 
among ASEAN countries. The biggest challenge in addressing food security in an event of another 2008 
price spike situation is should member countries in an economic union think of national autonomy or 
commitment to the regional trade agreement. In general, developing countries want to achieve food self-
sufficiency that enhances their autonomy. So achieving food security is of prime importance in national 
policy planning. However in order to achieve the national objective of food security, developing countries 




integrate countries via trade at the regional level with little to no barriers to internal trade. The extent of 
regional integration in the above agreements varies and depends on the extent to which the economies of 
these countries are dependent on each other. The economic integration achieved by APT countries is 
quite noteworthy when compared to other economic integrations (unions) worldwide. However, integration 
of agricultural trade to address food security is one of the most contentious issues for all the economic 
unions worldwide. As per Matthews (2003) agriculture in most of the countries in an economic union have 
different levels of domestic supports, and tariffs, therefore, harmonizing or developing a common 
consensus on common agricultural policy is challenging as to which country or countries have to take the 
economic burden of the trade reforms. In the case of developing countries there is a strong preference to 
achieve food security by making necessary market interventions such as providing input subsidies to 
domestic agriculture to increase production and placing import tariffs to protect domestic producers. In 
developed countries, members of an economic union that have high cost of agricultural production protect 
its producers by using tariffs therefore achieving a common agricultural policy between developed and 
developing members in a regional trade agreement is challenging (Matthews, 2003). However, 
regionalism can promote food security if there is harmonization of national agricultural policies, 
elimination of barriers to trade (phyto-sanitary measures) and supportive investment in agriculture at the 
national level that helps member countries to achieve their food security objectives (Matthews, 2003). As 
mentioned earlier on one hand the international rice market is unreliable as witnessed in 2008 price spike, 
but at same time reliance in international trade provides economic welfare to rice importing countries with 
low domestic prices. Therefore, use of the trade policy option to address price volatility and food security 
in the APT is debatable. According to Murphy (2009) addressing food security using trade as an policy 
option from an economic perspective often leads to the most efficient policy, but such policies are 
politically infeasible and administratively complicated (Murphy, 2009).On the contrary Anderson et al., 
(2012) argues that enhancing agricultural productivity by using domestic policy measures such as 
increased investment in agricultural research and development is ideal to achieve stable prices. They, 
reiterate that trade policy can address both short term and long term food security concerns. Over the 
longer term, based on scenario analysis of trade policies, both importing and exporting countries increase 




impact on net food buyers and non-food producing households. In the short term, trade barriers imposed 
by both importing and exporting countries to address international price spikes exacerbate each other 
leading to an increased spike in international price and unproductive market stabilizing efforts.  
Figure 1.4 Thai 100% B Price from June 2007 to December 2008 
 
The disruption of international trade in agricultural commodities has resulted in volatile food prices 
(Anderson et al., 2012). Based on theory of comparative advantage a country that is endowed in a 
particular resource e.g labor, is supposed to specialize in labor intensive products and rely on 
international trade for products intensively using other resources for which it does not have comparative 
advantage. The advantage of international trade in agriculture is explained by an example of changes in 
the rice economy of Philippines. In early 1960s Philippines was a net rice exporter however today it is one 
of the largest importers of rice. Philippines exploited its comparative advantage and focused on 
electronics and services exports rather than on rice production at the same time countries like Thailand 
and Myanmar exploited their comparative advantage in rice production (i.e. flat level land easily irrigated) 
and have become the world’s leading exporters (Dawe, Moya,& Casiwan, 2006; Anderson et al., 2012). 
However, can we rely on international trade when major rice exporters have natural disasters or ban 
exports to protect their domestic market? 
The series of events that culminated into 2007-2008 price spike of rice as depicted in figure 1.4. The 


























Index for Events 1.Vietnam bans sales 2.India restricts export  3.Vietnam again 
bans new sales 4.Phillppines tender >$700 5.Phillippines tender >$1100  6.US 




demand) and bad weather (that constrained supply) respectively, but the sudden rise in the price of rice is 
difficult to defend using market fundamentals of supply and demand (Dawe &.Slayton, 2010). The 
following explanation is based on Dawe and Slayton (2010) study of the world rice market crises of 2007-
2008. In October 2007, Indian ban on exports of non-basmati rice led to increase in price of Thai 100 
percent B by 43 percent (from 335 USD to 481 USD) in a period of four months. The decision to ban rice 
exports by Government of India was to compensate for the loss of 2006 wheat crop due bad weather and 
replace expensive imported wheat by reducing rice export. In Vietnam, the government regulates the 
quantity of rice exports using an export sales quota. In late July of 2007, Vietnam had reached its export 
sales quota and there was a ban on new exports sales so the international rice market anticipated the 
ban and there was no uncertainty in the market. But in 2008 there was another ban on rice exports in 
Vietnam placed due to unfavorable weather (although new exports were allowed for just two and half 
weeks). Vietnam had banned rice exports from April to June 2008 until Government to Government sales 
were approved to the Philippines. In spite of the ban on exports in Vietnam, Vinafood 2 (state trading 
enterprise) was permitted to participate in Philippines’ National Food Authority (state trading enterprise) 
tender of 700,000 Mt of which only 320,000 Mt was delivered in the first quarter due to a late harvest in 
Vietnam. The Philippines had increased the procurement price of rice by $70 USD per metric ton in 
January for Vietnamese rice (in spite of low local Thai and Vietnamese prices) to secure supplies and 
replenish low government stocks. In April-May of 2008, the Philippines request another tender for 1,100 
USD per metric ton that marked the peak of the price spike in 2008. In late May 2008, the Philippines 
withdrew the tender as a commercial buyer with no specifics on why the Philippines had such a large 
tender. A week later the US announced its permission that Japan could re-export all imported rice stocks 
of 1.5 Mmt and later in July Vietnam ended its ban bringing the price of Thai 100 Percent B down to 515 
USD per Mt (Slayton, 2009). According to Slayton (2009) it is not trade but rather transparency in the 
international rice market that contributed to the panic in rice market. But, Anderson et al. (2012) provides 
evidence that there is a strong incentive for countries involved in rice trade not to be protectionist as there 
are few exporters and importers so building a consensus is easy and adoption of  policies that reduce 





Table 1.7 Rice Production, Consumption, Imports and Exports in APT Countries for Year 2012 
ASEAN Countries Production Consumption Imports Exports 
 (1000 Mt) 
Brunei Darussalam 1 46 45   
Cambodia 4,600 3,615 5 975 
Indonesia 37,500 40,000 800   
Laos PDR 1,475 1,500 30  * 
Malaysia 1,700 2,819 1,050 *  
Myanmar (Burma) 10,750 10,300 *  750 
Philippines 11,350 12,925 1,500 *  
Singapore   350 350 *  
Thailand 20,200 10,500 600 8,000 
Vietnam 27,650 20,100 100 7,400 
PLUS THREE Countries     
China 143,000 144,000 2,400 300 
Japan 7,756 8,250 700 200 
South Korea 4,006 4,612 600 2 
Source: USDA, PS&D 2012. *NR (Not Reported) 
1.82 Futures Market 
In developed countries, commodity futures markets are used to hedge price risks. However, in most 
developing countries there is an absence or underdeveloped commodity futures market. Furthermore, 
even if they existed, the association of farmers and cooperatives would have a difficult time accessing 
future markets given the excessive costs associated with it (Dana & Gilbert, 2008; Gilbert 2011). 
Technically, futures markets have economic benefits of price discovery,24 price risk management and 
make the market transparent. Investment in transportation, storage, quality control and better integration 
of rice supply chain from farmers to consumers is a perquisite for a well-functioning futures market. 
However, in most ASEAN countries there is a high level of government intervention into the rice market 
also, there is lack of infrastructure and political environment that can be conducive for successful 
operation of the futures market (McKenzie, 2012). Therefore, expecting a fully functioning futures market 
like the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) is not a feasible currently. In the ASEAN region, importers and 
exporters from the private sector and government can use the futures market for hedging and to address 
food security only if there is free movement of rice across borders (McKenzie, 2012). To conclude “If the 
politics could be taken out of Asian rice markets, and government intervention reduced over time, a rice 
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futures market could play an important role in helping food security through greater economic growth of 
course, that is a big if " (McKenzie, 2012, p 45).  
1.83 Food Aid 
Food aid has been an important option to address price volatility in the rice markets. In the ongoing 
discussion on the Doha Development Round (DDR) many countries have argued that food aid from the 
developed countries (using export subsidies) have seriously undermined local producers in Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) and Net Food Importing Countries (NFIDC) (Clay,2012). It is important to 
know that in recent years the food aid donations in the form of commodities shipped from the developed 
world has been marginalized due to local sourcing of grains. The cereal imports in LDCs have decreased 
from 30 percent in 1990 to 8 percent in 2010 (Konandreas, 2012). In 2009 - 2010 almost half of the food 
aid was locally procured due to two important reasons. First, it takes about four to six months of time for 
the aid as a commodity from the donor to reach the recipient. Second the aid is more expensive by 30 to 
50 percent when procured from the donor country (OECD, 2005). The major focus of food aid is to 
address emergencies due to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. The food aid programs are not 
intended for addressing food security in the long term and there is a decline in the distribution of food aid 
in kind (Clay, 2012). The food aid is procyclic25 and is expected to diminish in a situation when the donor 
countries have depleted stocks and higher global prices (Clay, 2012). Slayton and Timmer (2008) insist 
that even in an emergency situation as witnessed in 2008 food aid was inadequate to meet needs of  
poor consumers globally as there are limited financial, logistical and political resources to make food aid 
effective in saving lives. In general the resources of World Food Program (WFP) are constrained when 
the global food price are higher. Based on Hussain (2012) an estimate of about 200 million USD are 
required additionally for a 10 percent increase in the price of a WFP food basket. In 2008, an additional 
775 million USD were spent to manage the rising costs of food prices and in 2010 the quantity of food 
purchased was 25 percent less than the previous year for the same amount of money (Hussain, 2012).
 Therefore, based on the above argument it is clear that there is a role for food aid in case of 
emergency situations such as natural disasters. But it is not sufficient to meet the national food security 
                                                          





objectives of the LDC and the NFIDC nations (Clay, 2012). Over the long term food aid is ineffective 
based on Barrett (2006) as there are numerous long term unintended consequences of food aid. First, in 
the long term identifying the intended beneficiaries of food aid is difficult due to lack of information on who 
needs food aid and who does not. Second food aid creates dependency and creates disincentive to work 
both in developing and developed countries26. Third, food aid is necessary to act as a safety net during 
the period of crises, but one of the unintended consequences of food aid is that it can crowd out or 
replace the conventional (either formal or informal) ways of insurance that existed in the system such as 
borrowing of money for food, provide household labor in exchange for food and other government relief 
efforts. Fourth, food aid can create dependency and lead to disinvestment in local production systems as 
there is no pay off in investing in local system that can produce food and may create demand for 
complementary food items when the recipient sells food aid to buy complementary items. Fifth, in 
situations when the domestic prices fall below the import price of a commodity, imports become unviable 
and sustainability of intermediaries in import supply chain and prospect for future trade are jeopardized. 
Finally, food aid can create incentives for the recipient countries to postpone much needed policy reform 
that can address food security with domestic agricultural production on a long term basis. Other long term 
consequences of food aid are failure to develop transparency (Harvey & Lind, 2005) and the quantity of 
food aid distributed is often small and recipients cannot rely on it (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005; Little, 2005; 
Lentz & Barrett, 2005).  
1.84 Grain Reserves 
The best way to increase confidence in a particular commodity market system is to have a reserve just 
like we have international institutes like International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial sector (Sarris, 
2010). The previous attempts to have grain reserves have failed , because once the prices are low with 
adequate supplies policymakers divert all the resources (financial) that are planned for having a reserve 
system to other important sectors of the economy (Sarris, 2010). To argue in favor of grain reserves it is 
important to understand the policy response of governments during previous food crises. Food crises 
have a devastating impact on the poorest of the poor and on average three food crises happen globally 
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for every century (Timmer, 2010a). There have been policy reforms in the past to address food security 
concerns in the APT region. The most recent food security policy response to the world food crises of 
1974 by the ASEAN countries was addressed through stockholding of basic commodities 
(Hangpongpandh, 1982). The proposed program of stockholding was not operational due to lack of 
political and economic commitment by ASEAN countries. Furthermore, the subsequent events in Asia 
such as rapid economic development as well as increased rice production and gradual liberalization of 
agricultural trade have eroded the perceived need for any policy intervention. The probability of decline in 
food production in developing countries in 1960 and 1970 was countered by the green revolution and 
prices since then remained almost stable for a long duration of time (ADB, 2012). Over the past decade 
APT countries have undergone rapid trade liberalization and achieved economic integration where 
current policy responses to address food security are inadequate. In addition increased population, 
decreases in agriculture productivity, and the climate change threat have added to the urgent need for a 
collective policy response. There was lack of regional policy response in the spirit of an economic union 
from governments of APT countries to address food security. Events that lead to the 2008 food crises 
(see figure 1.4) is a testimony of national governments acting in their self-interest by going antitrade 
(Slayton, 2009). Figure 1.4 revealed that the 2008 price spike was not due to any natural disaster, but 
rather due to the sequential self-interested policy decisions causing panic in major rice trading countries 
that made price spike worse. Although, speculation among rice traders may be another reason for the 
price spike, nevertheless, given the political nature of rice it was governments in respective importing and 
exporting countries that exacerbated the price spike problem. 
According to ADB (2012) although use of grain reserves is a pragmatic strategy to address price volatility, 
the role of government in storage of agricultural commodities creates more uncertainty in the market as 
decision making of government parastatal agencies is sporadic and politically driven. Therefore, Wright 
(2011) argues that the collective action problem of grain storage can be addressed if all governments are 
not involved in the storage business as the private sector can provide a price floor when prices are lower 




crop failure, large scale governments may counter such a situation by a joint stock holding27 program with 
well-established rules of buying and selling (ADB, 2012). However, based on Gilbert (2010) the 
commitment of governments on international commodity agreement has resulted in disappointing results. 
During the last price spike of 1973-1974 at international level there was an agreement to establish a 
global stock to address future price spikes but lack of commitment on ways and means to finance and 
manage any such agreement was never finalized (Gilbert, 2010; Wiggins & Keats, 2010). In Asia, 
regional food security has become a major focus of the APT nations based on explanations provided in 
earlier sections of the chapter. Based on Wailes and Chavez (2012) analysis ASEAN nations will account 
for are expected to play a major role in the global rice market in next decade by accounting for 53% and 
14 % of net exports and imports respectively, while total production and total rice consumption will 
account for 25% and 22% respectively in the global rice economy. The main objective of this research is 
to analyze the policy option of regional grain reserves in addressing price volatility in ASEAN countries. 
1.85 Objectives 
The objectives of this dissertation are to 1) assess the economic impact of the regional grain reserve 
(APTERR) on the APT rice markets as well as its spillover effect on the domestic APT rice economy 
under alternative production shortfalls and the release of APTERR stocks scenarios; 2) assess the 
political impact of the regional grain reserves and the challenges and constraints in formulating and 
developing operational rules that will facilitate its success; and 3) evaluate the food security objective in 
the wider set of issues that makes the ASEAN organization relevant and important from a regional 
governance perspective. The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In chapter 2, a review of the 
relevant literature on grain reserves is presented and discussed. Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology 
for empirical analysis while, chapters 4 and 5 will discuss results and conclude the finding of the study 
respectively. 
  
                                                          




Chapter 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 International Grain Reserves 
The major source for volatility in food prices is speculation, hoarding, and rising expectations of higher 
returns in commodity markets (Von Braun & Torero, 2009a). The idea of having a regional grain reserve 
has been on the agenda of regional economic organizations whenever the supply of grains is constrained 
due to natural disasters or when food prices spike in the international grain markets. The concept of a 
regional grain reserve is an ideal strategic tool to mitigate food crisis situations like that of 2008. The idea 
of a regional grain reserve has been on the agenda of policymakers for decades, but, there is a lack of 
political and economic will to have an operational grain reserve. In the following section we will explore 
classification of grain reserves, some of opportunities and challenges of regional grain reserves, the 
conceptual and empirical framework, and previous experiences with operational grain reserves. The 
chapter will conclude with a review of the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Grain Reserves (APTERR), its 
basic design and pose questions regarding challenges and opportunities. 
2.11 Classification of Grain Reserves 
Based on the geographic area of operation grain reserves are classified into three categories 
1. National Grain Reserves: These reserves are generally held by state parastatals who are largely 
responsible for the national food security mission. In ASEAN countries some of the well known national 
grain reserves are Badan Urusan Logistik (BULOG) in Indonesia, National Food Authority (NFA) in 
Philippines and Padiberas Nasional Berhad (BERNAS) in Malaysia, 
2. Regional Grain Reserves: There are very few regional grain reserves where the scope of their 
operation is based on agreement between a group of countries. The majority grain reserve schemes are 
restricted to a particular geographical area. Some of the notable regional grain reserves that are widely 
discussed in academic literature are ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserves (APTERR) in south 
east Asia, Latin America & Caribbean Emergency Response Network (LACERN) in central and south 




Development Community (SADC) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Food 
Bank in South Asia. 
3. International Grain Reserve: An international grain reserve is a multinational agreement among a group 
of countries that commits their grain and financial resources to address global food security. In the past 
as well as at present there are various proposals to have an operational international grain reserves but 
there has been no operational international grain reserve unless one considers the World Food Program 
(WFP) as an international grain reserve. The WFP functions with five different partners; National 
government, Non-Government Organizations (NGO), FAO and International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), other UN agencies and corporate partners (wfp.org).The Food Security Monitoring 
Systems (FSMS) of the WFP collects household data on food consumption and income, monitors market 
prices and rainfall patterns, and outlines strategies to address food insecurity. The WFP’s officials from 
Food Aid Monitor, Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), and Strengthening Emergency Needs 
Assessment Capacity (SENAC) assist in food procurement balancing food markets and emergency 
situations (WFP, 2012b). In 2012, the WFP distributed a total of 3.5 million Mt of food globally (WFP, 
2012a). The WFP procures large quantity of food locally to save time and money, but as WFP operations 
are largely to address emergency situations therefore procurement is based on needs of the emergency 
situation as well as availability of funding (WFP, 2012b). In 2012, the WFP purchased 2.1 million metric 
tons of food, about 77 percent (in terms of value in USD) of total food procured was from developing 
countries. There is another dimension of characterizing grain reserves e.g a national, regional or global 
grain reserve could be a physical, virtual or both. The former is a traditional grain reserve where there is 
actual physical stock. While the latter is a commitment by countries to contribute to a pool of grain 
reserves in form of financial support to buy grains on the international market or supply buffer stocks in 
case of a natural calamity. The virtual grain reserves are a commitment of resources to the organization's 
objective. 
2.12 Regional Grain Reserves 





1. SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Food Bank  
The SAARC is a regional grain reserve in South Asia, its members are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The organization is not fully operational and decision 
making in the organization is delegated to an oversight board. The SAARC members have commitment of 
243,000 Mt of rice and wheat stocks and they have plans to increase the total reserve commitment to 
400,000 Mt to one million tons (CDI, 2011). According to the Government of India (GOI), India has agreed 
to contribute 306,400 Mt out of a total share of 486,000 Mt to SAARC food bank (GOI, 2013). 
2. RESOGEST 
The RESOGEST is a regional grain reserve in West Africa formed by members of the Sahel region in 
Africa.  RESOGEST members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. The regional grain reserve is in its early stage of development where 
member states have made a minimum commitment28 of 5% of national food stocks to this regional grain 
reserve (CILSS, 2012). The reserves are a combination of grain stocks, monetary funds and an early 
warning system to inform about future food crises. 
3. Latin America & Caribbean Emergency Response Network (LACERN) 
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have teamed up with WFP to form an emergency response 
unit to address natural disasters in Caribbean and Latin America called LACERN (Action Aid 
International, 2011). The regional headquarter of LACERN is located in Panama City and sub-regional 
offices for Central America, South America and the Caribbean are in El Salvador, Ecuador and Barbados 
respectively (OECD, 2010). The LACERN is not a typical grain reserve but a food reserve that is stocked 
with 450 tons of High Energy Biscuits (HEB) with support from individual governments in form of 
warehouse for storage of the food stocks (OECD, 2010).  
                                                          




2.13 Governance of Grain Reserves 
The State Trading Enterprises (STE) instituted by developing countries to address food security have 
their own approach to address using grain reserves, irrespective of their approach, the STE are supposed 
to operate a grain reserves as a commercial enterprise under the WTO regime. However, STEs operate 
typically under a price band that places a supply control mechanism on the domestic market by using 
tiered tariffs (Murphy, 2012a). The status of regional grain reserves in the WTO is not clear. Unlike STEs 
which are supposed to operate as a commercial enterprise the regional grain reserves currently do not 
have any such status in WTO and are largely governed by representatives from member countries 
contributing to the grain reserves. The WTO Article XVIII on the STE states the operation of a STE should 
be on transparent and operate on commercial basis, and there should be no quantitative restriction as 
well as subsidies for STE that would distort trade (WTO, 2014)       
 The efficient management of grain reserve is a prerequisite for a sustainable grain reserve 
system. The management aspect such as rotation of grain stocks is essential to make grain reserves 
appealing to relevant stakeholders such as sponsors and recipients of grain reserves. However, 
management of grain reserves stocks is typically clumsy and lacks efficiency unlike the private market 
(Murphy, 2012a). Private grain companies hold grain reserves to make profit whereas public grain 
reserves are financed by public funds to address food security. So, use of public funds to finance grain 
reserves with lack of transparency can be trade distorting under the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) (Murphy 2012b). Regional grain reserves can be operated by multistate agency or by an 
independent regional authority. Some of the advantages of regional grain reserves are as follows (Crola, 
2011). First, regional grain reserves can smooth supply and demand over a wide area by addressing 
supply constraint with surpluses from the same region. Second, regional grain reserves can offer 
economies of scale in supply and distribution. Third, there would be no meddling of individual 
governments to gain political advantage as monitoring of the regional grain reserve would be at a supra 
national level (Flament, 2010). Fourth, regional grain reserves have the potential to boost regional 




2.14. Opportunities of a Regional Grain Reserves  
Regional grain reserves correct for a market failure in an event when producers are unable to supply the 
grains at normal or socially desirable prices. The intervention via regional grain reserves brings the prices 
down to an affordable level where consumers can be assured of food security. Grain reserves, from a 
policy perspective, smoothen and reduce the volatility in prices by balancing seasonal supply of 
production uniformly across the year (Murphy, 2009). The regional grain reserves offer economies of 
scale and are cost effective with respect to stabilizing prices (Flament, 2010). Grain reserves can aid an 
undercapitalized private market on one end while replacing a private market (monopolistic or oligopolistic) 
that adopts a predatory pricing strategy on the other end (Murphy, 2009). In Asia, demand for rice is 
constantly increasing and supply is unpredictable, therefore, regional grain reserves can be an ideal tool 
in mitigating such challenges of unstable supply to meet steady consumption growth. Reserves can 
maintain market confidence and reduce speculation in the aftermath of crises (Murphy, 2009). World rice 
markets are price volatile and rice is traded on a residual basis to meet national production deficits; 
therefore, sourcing from the international rice market is not ideal when there are enormous challenges in 
sourcing if the production shortfall is global causing overall rice prices to be high. The food crisis of 2008 
is a testimony of price volatility in the international rice market. Realistically, maintaining the public's 
confidence via a safety net like regional or international grain reserves is essential (Wright, 2009). From a 
public policy perspective, the use of cash to buy food is an efficient way than to maintain costly grain 
reserves. However, according to Murphy (2009) use of cash to buy food from the international market 
may not be useful in developing countries for two main reasons; first, the local staples food grains they 
want may be not available in the international market. Second, even if it is available or close acceptable 
substitutes are available, there is the possibility that developing countries cannot afford to buy when that 
is only possible at much higher food prices (Murphy, 2009). Based on a proposal by International Food 
Policy Research Institute supported by Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (IFPRI) 
an international grain reserve is proposed which would have the following features; first, it would include 




costs and inefficiency related to grain storage, and third, there would be virtual reserves29 that guarantee 
market fundamentals of supply and demand in the grain market and be managed to avoid price spikes 
(Von Braun & Torero, 2009b). 
2.15 Challenges in Regional Grain Reserves 
Regional grain reserves fall under government supervision, which is not always competitive, timely, and 
as effective as private stock holding (Murphy, 2009). Regional grain reserves have their disadvantages 
such as high storage costs and slow transactions in managing huge grain reserves (Von Braun and 
Torero, 2009b). Grain reserves are often used to achieve multiple targets rather than just a specific one 
which leads to confusion in implementation (Murphy, 2009). The management of stocks in a regional 
grain reserves should be based on accurate information of carryover stocks where costs of obtaining 
accurate information can be challenging. The data on stocks is gathered from published statistical reports 
of FAO, United State Department of Agriculture (USDA), national reports, academic and professional 
reports, and International Grain Council (IGC) and most of the time information is subject to error 
(Wiggins and Keats, 2010). Grain reserves do not solve chronic hunger and are not structural solutions to 
the problem of food security (Wright, 2009). Grain reserves operated by the public sector often crowds 
out private stock holding and discourage private investment in storage and supply chain infrastructure 
(Anderson et al., 2012). The basic cause of food insecurity is the inability of developing countries to fund 
the long term investments needed to achieve productivity gains in food production. There is also the short 
run problem that the operational costs and supervision of grain reserve programs are costly (Murphy, 
2009).Grain reserve stocks need rotation due to the perishable nature of grains and disposing of 
previously held stock is often controversial with respect to the selling price because old stocks tend to get 
dumped on the market causing price suppression (Murphy, 2009).    
 Regional grain reserves however are a good option to manage an unexpected and sudden rise in 
food prices. However, the unintended consequence of the existence of a grain reserve is disincentive to 
have private markets. Government intervention in the private markets when food prices are high by using 
                                                          
29Virtual reserves is a tool to reduce speculation in futures markets by taking  short position in commodity 
markets to reduce the spot price using cash reserves (12-20 billion) from donor nations which reduces 




grain reserves may be ideal to bring about price stability. However, there is a challenge in determination 
of the threshold or trigger price to activate government intervention into the market using grain reserves. 
Policy advocates from IFPRI, IMF, World Bank and other international institutes have criticized the 
concept of grain reserves, on the basis that markets are better indicators of consumer prices and 
quantities (Murphy, 2009). Additionally, there are large numbers of unknown factors that determine 
exactly when, where, and how much of grain reserves are needed in stocks. In Murphy’s (2009) terms, it 
is just guess work on the amount of grains to be stored, determined less by economic analysis and more 
of by politics with respect to quantity of grain held in reserves. Likewise, there are other questions such as 
transparency, accountability, and efficiency in managing of grain reserves that need to be studied. 
Previous experiences with grain reserves had persistent problems of corruption, and politicians using it to 
achieve their vested interests such as distributing free food grains or subsidizing food grains for 
consumers before elections (Murphy, 2009). A lack of independence in management raises questions 
with the credibility of the regional grain reserves management to meet its public interest objective of 
addressing food security and price stability. Technically, grain reserves are not totally independent of 
private grain operators like Multinational Grain Companies (MGC).30 MGCs have a vital role in public 
policy of grain reserve logistics as they are responsible for transportation of grain during major food aid 
operations (Murphy, 2009). Therefore, balancing the business interests of MGC (private organizations) 
which is profit driven and the humanitarian interests of regional or international grain reserves (public 
organizations) is often difficult. Finally, the international trade in agriculture commodities is very thin 
(percentage of total staple food production traded) when compared to manufactured products. Advocates 
of trade liberalization in agriculture are skeptical of regional or international grain reserves as they are not 
sure if grain reserves will be either operating independently or would be an integrated part of international 
markets (Murphy, 2009). National leaders and decision makers believe that it would be costly to operate 
regional grain reserves and members of a regional grain reserve may lose their independence over 
decision making of food reserves due to lack of a proper legal framework and commitment of other 
nations to follow a rule based system of the regional grain reserves (Flament, 2010). The general 
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argument made by Von Braun and Torero (2012) in favor of grain reserves is that reserves cannot 
stabilize prices, but they can prevent a sudden rise in prices of agricultural commodities. Action Aid 
International argues that international grain reserves lack financial support and political commitment at 
the highest level of the organization (Action Aid International, 2011).The proposal for establishing 
international grain reserve (that stores multiple commodities) is complicated as market structures of  
wheat, corn, or rice are different and any change in one market may impact another markets, e.g. as 
stock to use ratio of wheat is different from corn, therefore estimation of stock holding capacity for multiple 
commodities is difficult (McCreary, 2011). The concern just mentioned applies to regional grain reserves 
that have plans to store multi commodities.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework of Grain Reserves 
The studies on the theory of commodity price stabilization by Brandow (1976), Cochrane, Willard, and 
Danin (1976), and Schmitz, (1984), and the welfare theory of grain reserves by Eaton, (1980) are the 
seminal works. The more recent theoretical framework of grain reserves as elaborated by Basu (2011) 
and Wright (2009) is used to explain the objective and implementation of grain reserves. The theory of 
food market intervention is explain by Basu (2011) using a domestic grain reserves and the role of 
government in providing a price floor to producers as well as its role in price stabilization. The theoretical 
framework of a regional grain reserves is similar to national grain reserves. The theoretical works per se 
on the regional grain reserves and its impact on the food security in group of developing countries is 
elaborated by Wright and Cafiero (2009). The literature below outlines the theory of food market 
intervention (Basu, 2011). 
2.21 Theory of Food Market Intervention 
In the absence of government intervention the market price of rice is at equilibrium Pm, often called the 
market equilibrium price (figure 2.1). But, when the price reaches Ph due to a production shortfall in a 
basic food staple, there is a legitimate rationale for government intervention to address the food security 
concern of the consumers. Figure 2.2 demonstrates that a change in the supply of rice with and without 
production shortfall and effect of the grain reserves in a country. In the absence of government 




2.2). In order to address the price spike or higher commodity price, the government of a food importing 
country would seek to intervene into the commodity market with a release of national or regional rice 
stocks onto the domestic market thereby driving the price to Pg and addressing the food security concern 
of a typical food deficit importing country. If a country has domestic production of rice, government 
provide a price floor for farmers which is little above the market price equilibrium and procures for national 
grain reserves to address future shortfall in rice production. However, the price floor argument is irrelevant 
in case of a regional grain reserve as the intervention into the domestic food market of a member country 
is based on the guidelines as outlined in the memorandum of understanding among members. 












Figure 2.2 Food Market with Government Intervention 
 
Source: Adapted Adapted from “India’s foodgrain policy: An economic theory perspective” by K. Basu, 
2011, Economic & Political Weekly, 46(5), 37-45. 
The intervention into the domestic market of a typical importing country using emergency grain reserve is 
based on the premise that an importing country has a genuine emergency  
2.22 Economics of Grain Reserve 
The annual grain harvest (Ht) accounts for abnormalities in weather conditions that can impact 
production. Ht is a random variable that represents current production. In figure 2.3 the demand curve A 
C is composed of two demands , first is current consumption Ct (represented as AB in Figure 2.3 ) at 
period t and second is demand for stocks (Xt) (future consumption) as (represented by BC in figure 2.3) at 
time t+1 . In case of grain reserves available supply is the sum of two supplies, the supply available at 
harvest (Ht) and the supply that is carried over from the previous year (Xt-1) carry over stock. A grain 
reserve which is commercially operated will account for the cost of storage as well as interest on the 
investment made in stocks.  











(Note:  Stocks cannot be negative and the organization holding stocks can be any public or private and 
assume the price of stocks does not change due to deterioration, Wright, 2009). The current supply is 
represented as follows.  
Supply = Current Harvest Ht + Stocks from previous year (Xt-1) = Current Consumption (Ct) + Stocks (Xt) 
Prices are very sensitive to supply shocks especially when stocks are low. On the demand side, 
consumption with and without stocks has a very different impact on price. When consumption is in the 
range of BC prices are low due presence of carryover stocks, on the contrary in absence of carryover 
stocks, consumption is represented by BE in figure 2.3 is less responsive (inelastic) to price changes. In 
such a situation consumers of a staple grain like rice have to sacrifice all expenses on education and 
healthcare to meet their food requirement. The situation in 1972-1973 food price crises was due to low 
stocks and high prices (Wright, 2009). Also, in a situation when current production is lower and there are 
no stocks annual prices can almost double. Therefore, stocks are critical in modulating price of food 
grains. The principle of grain reserves is, when prices are low a large quantity of stocks can be acquired 




Figure 2.3 Economics of Grain Reserves 
 
Source: Adapted from “International grain reserves and other instruments to address volatility in grain 
markets”, by B. Wright, 2009, Policy Research Working Paper Series 5028, The World Bank. 
2. 3 Past Experiences of Grain Reserves 
 
Some of the widely discussed regional grain reserves are maintained by regional organizations such as 
the G-20, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SARRC), Southern African Development 
Community (SDAC31) and ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR).The regional grain 
reserve  in the G-20 proposal is designed to operate based on market principles that can be used to 
address emergency or humanitarian ends (Gilbert, 2011) .In 1987, members of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established a regional grain reserve of 242,000 Mt to 
address food security in the South Asian region in case of an emergency (Briones, 2011). The SAARC 
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members include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
There is limited documentation on the nature or implementation details of the SAARC regional grain 
reserve. However based on SWATEE working paper on Nepal and Bangladesh (2012) SAARC regional 
grain reserves seem to be largely non-operational due to several organizational challenges such as lack 
of financial, institutional and political commitment. In the proposed research APTERR Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) will be used to frame and evaluate the effectiveness of ASEAN Plus Three emergency 
regional grain reserve on the domestic market of a member country and its spillover into the regional rice 
market. In order to know the APTERR framework, its origin, and structure it is essential to understand the 
political economy of the APT countries. The next section of the chapter will discuss the political economy 
of the APT countries.  
2.4 Political Economy of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Countries 
The Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) was an intergovernmental political framework that lead to formation of 
APT. The ASEM was an attempt to organize East Asian countries that do not promote East Asian 
regionalism as observed in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and EAEC (East Asian Economic 
Caucus) but as an cooperative framework of ASEAN , China, Japan and South Korea countries where 
government representatives have various meetings (Suzuki, 2004). The APT framework started with the 
ASEAN members meeting regularly with non ASEAN members at different summits and conferences with 
no formal institutional settings (Suzuki, 2004). As a majority of the relational management in the APT 
framework takes place at the meeting in conferences and summits, is the approach is called conference 
diplomacy32. The Malaysian argument was that the APT framework had excluded countries like New 
Zealand and Australia because they do not share Asian values like the APT members (Suzuki, 2004). 
Therefore the structure of APT is restricted to thirteen East Asian Countries that share Asian values. 
 According to Suzuki’s (2004) assessment of the five important features of the APT framework are 
as follows  
                                                          
32As defined by Kaufmann (1996 p.7) Conference diplomacy is “part of the management of relations 
between governments and of relations between governments and international organizations that takes 




1. The APT framework is an association of ASEAN and Non ASEAN members, where the non- 
ASEAN members are China, Japan and South Korea. 
2. A wide variety of issues (table 2.1) are discussed among ministers of APT countries. The number 
of issues discussed in the APT framework has increased over a period of time. 
3. The APT is not a formal organization but has a multilayered decision-making structure with 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) being at the top followed by ASEAN Plus One (any plus three member) 
and Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea). The structure is presented in figure 2.4. 
4. The decision making of APT framework is based on consensus building. 
5. The issues covered under the three different ASEAN plus one frameworks (ASEAN Plus China, 
ASEAN Plus Japan and ASEAN Plus South Korea) were economic, social and political (ASEAN 
Japan, 1997; ASEAN China, 1997; ASEAN ROK, 1997). 
Table 2.1 Different level of Co-operation in ASEAN Plus Three member (APT) Framework 
Level of Cooperation Issues 
ASEAN Plus Three  APTERR, Asian Financial Cooperation 
ASEAN Plus One ASEAN free trade agreement, Transnational Crime (Piracy 
Terrorism  
Plus Three Air Pollution, Marine Pollution, ASEAN free trade agreement 
Source: Author’s Construct, from Suzuki, 2004 
 
Figure 2.4 Multi-layered Decision Making Structure of APT 
 
 
In the multi-layer structure of APT, ASEAN+1 is the most favored structure maintained by China and 
Japan in order to maintain their political advantage with ASEAN countries (Sukuzi, 2004). Likewise, 
ASEAN countries are comfortable in ASEAN+1 in order the limit influence of China (Takano, 2001; 








concludes that irrespective of whether it is the ASEAN+1 or ASEAN+3 arrangement, ASEAN as an 
organization can use the APT framework to maintain its political leverage and reduce the economic and 
political impact of non ASEAN members on the ASEAN members and aid ASEAN countries to build a 
cordial relationship with non ASEAN countries. The APT framework was used by Japan to initiate the 
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in response to Asian financial crises of 1997. The US position on the AMF is 
that it is should be a complementary organization to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and it should 
not undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the IMF, a global financial Institute (Kawai, 2009). 
Despite its initial challenges and above mentioned objections by the US, the Asian Monetary Fund has 
evolved into the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI).The APT initiative that is responsible for the food security by 
using a regional grain reserves in Asia is the APTERR. The next section of the chapter will discuss the 
food security framework for APT countries. 
2.5 APT Cooperation in Agriculture and Food Security 
The first APT ministerial meeting on Agriculture was held in Medan, Indonesia in 2001 (Suzuki, 2004). 
The organization that was instituted for coordination of activities related to agricultural cooperation in APT 
framework was ASEAN Agricultural Ministerial Meeting (AMAF) and Senior Official Meeting (SOM) 
(AMAF+3, 2001). The cooperation of agriculture among APT countries pioneered establishment of 
APTERR. The APTERR pilot project started on a voluntary basis in 2003 and as of 2011 it is the official 
cooperation organization within member countries to address food security issues. The APTERR was 
promoted by Thailand and Japan and all meeting prior to 2003 were structured in ASEAN Plus One 
framework. Since 2003, China’s Ministry of Agriculture has signed on to offer technical assistance to 
ASEAN countries by sending their experts to foster agricultural development in ASEAN countries 
(Takahara, 2003; ASEAN China, 2002). The cooperation among APT members in setting up free trade 
agreements between ASEAN and Plus Three countries was not a success. However, ASEAN Plus One 
structure of free trade agreement was pursued by Plus three members in absence of a comprehensive 
APT free trade agreement (Suzuki, 2004). Similarly, members within ASEAN countries have actively 
pursued FTA with Plus Three members on bilateral basis. The only case where there is cooperation both 
at the Plus Three level as well as at APT level is on environmental issues (Suzuki, 2004). The high level 




marine pollution that needed to be addressed by achieving cooperation among members given the 
transnational context of the problem.         
 The decision making in many of the international conferences is by consensus even when voting 
among members can be ideal to get an opinion from a group of members (Kaufmann 1996). Decision 
making in the APT framework is achieved by building consensus among members in meetings. Similarly, 
at all three levels of decision making (APT, ASEAN Plus One, and Plus Three) there is mutual 
understanding among members to accommodate preferences of member states (Suzuki, 2004). But 
when there is a decision among APT members that requires implementation on an agreement, members 
are strategic and choose one particular level that is in their best interest (Suzuki, 2004).  
 In summary the APT framework reflects the decision making structure of ASEAN which is the 
core of the entire framework (Suzuki, 2004).The major challenge in consensus-based decision making is 
that different members have different interpretations and understanding of documents. Therefore, instead 
of making concrete decision on the consensus building there is “pseudo consensus” (Kaufmann 1996, p. 
29). Based on Suzuki’s (2004) assessment the APT framework is loose cooperation among members on 
different issues that takes place during conferences.      
 The APT framework does not have a secretariat and ASEAN members fear that setting up of 
another ASEAN like organization (APT) will undermine the political leverage of ASEAN (Suzuki, 2004). 
Based on Simon’s (2008) assessment neither ASEAN nor its extensions like ASEAN Plus One and 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT), have a central mechanism to either monitor or enforce members 
commitments. Likewise, the APEC, which competes for leadership of South East Asian regional 
governance, as an organization is focused more on trade liberalization and regional economic integration 
without any specifics on what is the regional definition of Asia Pacific (Besson, 2006,). Katsumata (2006) 
furthermore adds that First, APT as an East Asian forum is a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
Second, the nature of APT meetings or agreements does not incorporate any established international 
organization standard for a treaty. Third, it is an arena where participants put forward their international 
initiatives and agendas for regional cooperation. Besson (2006) argues that status quo of economic 




transparency, protectionism, and an inability of east Asian countries to work effectively as a single entity 
responsible for regional economic development (p 189). 
2.6 ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) 
The APTERR started with the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR) in 1979 as an organizational 
response to the food crises of 1974. The AERR had a commitment 87,000 Mt of rice stocks and was not 
operationalized until 2003 (Table 2.2).The AERR was not operational or lacked success in addressing 
emergencies for past 25 years due to a lack of a trigger mechanism for release of reserves which were 
supposed to be available only for declared emergencies. (Dano & Peria, 2006; Trethewie, 2013). These 
restrictions in release of reserves were deliberately introduced in the AERR as officials responsible for 
AERR believed that countries would use reserves instead of normal trade to meet their production 
shortfall and distort normal rice trade (Trethewie, 2013). 
In 2003 AERR was renamed the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR) when Plus Three 
countries (China, South Korea and Japan) joined the grain reserve program. The EAERR as an 
organization was developed with a mandate based on member’s rice stocks commitment to the rice 
reserve program. The organization was officially established on October 7th, 2011, in Jakarta, Indonesia 
by an agreement signed by Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry representing 13 member APT countries 
(www.apterr.org). The current APTERR stocks are 787,000 Mt and country level commitments to stocks 
are detailed in table 2.2. The objective of the APTERR is to strengthen food security and reduce poverty 
in APT countries. To be specific APTERR is designed to meet immediate food security needs of the APT 
countries in two ways. First, to address food security needs of member countries in case of a natural 
disaster. Second, to prevent panic in the regional rice markets (reduce price volatility) in response to 
production shortfall in any member countries.  
2.61 Management of the APTERR 
The APTERR as an organization is under the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry 
(AMAF). The Senior Officials Meeting (SOM)-AMAF is the apex ASEAN organization that addresses food 
security issues in consultation with the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) 




and relevant institutes including the Asian Development Bank. The APTERR meetings are held regularly 
at different locations in ASEAN countries. 
Table 2.2 ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserves Stocks in APT Countries in metric tons. 
Countries Earmarked Stock 
ASEAN Countries ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (1979) APTERR 
Brunei Darussalam  - 3,000 
Cambodia  - 3,000 
Indonesia  12,000 12,000 
Lao PDR  - 3,000 
Malaysia  6,000 6,000 
Myanmar  - 14,000 
Philippines  12,000 12,000 
Singapore  5,000 5,000 
Thailand  15,000 15,000 
Viet Nam  - 14,000 
Plus Three Countries   
China - 300,000 
Japan - 250,000 
Korea - 150,000 
Total  50,000 787,000 
Source: Agreement on the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (2011) 
 
The day to day management of the APTERR is assigned to the Management Team of the East Asia 
Emergency Rice Reserve (MT- EAERR) at their office hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives of Thailand (MOAC). The decision making in APTERR on the release of the stocks is made 
by having a consensus among the MT- EAERR or the APTERR Council and there are guidelines outlined 
in the agreement as to what constitutes an emergency for release of stocks. The details on APTERR 
standard operating procedures are developed for stakeholders by the ASEAN Secretariat and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), but specifics of the standard operating procedures are not available to the 
public (Trethewie, 2013). The APTERR reserves are classified into two categories: first, the stockpile 
reserves (tier 3) and second, the earmarked stocks (tier 2) (787,000 Mt).Table 2.3 elaborates in detail on 
the APTERR stocks and their intended purposes. The purpose of tier 1 and tier 2 stocks is to address 
shortfall in production of rice (non - emergency) by using commercial trade. The purpose of tier 3 stocks 
release is to address acute food shortage due to a natural disaster. The emergency food aid which is in 
form of donations are classified as a tier 3 stocks. The APTERR organization will review the request to 
release APTERR stocks based on a pre-negotiated contract between two countries (importer and 




releases under tiers 1 and 2 should not exceed the set commitment levels (apterr.org). The storage of 
stocks is the responsibility of the member country that has committed its stocks to the APTERR and there 
is no APTERR warehouse of the organization. The quality of rice committed to the grain reserves will be 
based on international food safety standards and should be fit for consumption (apterr.org). Figure 2.5 
represents type of payment arrangements for different tiers  
Table 2.3 Classification of the APTERR Tiers based on Purpose, Source and Beneficiary. 
 
2.62 Challenges in having an Operational APTERR 
The objective of a typical emergency rice reserve is to protect the poorest of the poor in an event of an 
extreme price spike as seen in 2008. There are six major challenges in the operation of APTERR. They 
are as follows.            
 First, as discussed earlier, an extreme price spike may be either due to manmade speculation or 
due to a natural calamity. But addressing a price spike using a regional emergency reserve like APTERR 
can be tricky as it can be a tool used by the state representative of a recipient country to avoid normal 
trade and make a country aid dependent. Therefore estimation of the optimal level of reserve release is a 
complex issue (Briones, 2011). In particular, the trigger mechanism for the release of APTERR stocks 
should be more specific as it is quite complex to define an emergency wherein there will be a release of 
APTERR reserves (Sarris, 2010).        
 Second, it is imperative to address the issues of cost in financing the APTERR as an 
organization. There is lack of permanent technical and financial assistance as well as institutional support 
in running day to day operations of the APTERR (Briones, 2011).Currently, there is temporary support 
from Thailand’s Ministry of Agriculture and Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to cover 
the administrative cost of APTERR. The financial system that assists in the operation of APTERR should 
Tier Common Name Intended Purpose Source of Reserves 













Emergency Loan / 
Grant, 
 
So far there has been no 
release of rice stocks 





release of rice to 
disaster victims 
Free food aid: donations 
in form of cash or 
physical rice 
Largely financed by 
Japan and supported by 
Thailand 




be funded by APT members to make it a self-financed organization. As far as technical assistance is 
concern there should be an initiative in the APT to develop a reliable information system that can assist 
APTERR with current and possible emergency situations in the APT countries.   
 Third hurdle in having a successful APTERR operation is to have uniformity or harmonization of 
rules, regulations and laws within APT countries with respect to release of stocks, payment and logistics 
(Briones, 2011).           
 Fourth, will the current level of APTERR reserve (787,000 Mt) be sufficient to stabilize prices in 
ASEAN or APT countries in case there is a large production shortfall (Sarris, 2010).  
 Fifth, critics like Bernabe (2010)33 argues that there are no details on the APTERR such as how a 
country can have access and distribute reserves. Even if there is an easy access to grain reserves for a 
country is there any apparatus to know if the rice reserves are promoting food security or is it just 
dumping of rice into already functioning markets (Sampson, 2010).    
 Sixth, some of the other constraints that hampered the development of EAERR were inefficiency 
in the process of acceptance and delivery of emergency aid (Trethewie, 2013).There are no specifics on 
the time duration it will take for approval of food aid and its final delivery in the APTERR framework. 
 To summarize, the structure and management of APTERR should be explored to make it a 
permanent institute that is dynamic and adaptive to changing market and financial conditions (Briones, 
2011). 
                                                          

















Chapter 3 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter the analytical framework used to evaluate the APTERR in deterministic and stochastic 
framework is presented. The discussion will elaborate on the deterministic and stochastic procedures 
used in generating results presented in chapter 4. There are five major structural global rice models 
namely: RICEFLOW, Arkansas Global Rice Model (AGRM), IRRI Global Rice Model (IGRM), AGLINK-
COSIMO (OCED-FAO) and CCLS (USDA). These identified models that have been extensively used in 
the analysis of global rice policies with respect to trade, climate change and technology assessments. 
RICEFLOW, AGRM, and IGRM are partial econometric frameworks of the global rice economy with a few 
differences with respect to their structure, price equilibrium, and disaggregation of regions within 
countries. The major differences between AGRM, IGRM and the RICEFLOW models are presented in 
table 3.1.            
 The AGRM and IGRM models have less flexibility in modeling stocks whereas RICEFLOW model 
is the most flexible model to simulate the scenario of the research question posed in this dissertation. The 
flexibility offered by RICEFLOW model is that policy variables can be made endogenous or exogenous 
based on the user’s specification. In order to assess the impact of grain reserves in addressing price 
volatility it is important to have the unique and important structure of the RICEFLOW framework that can 
evaluate changes in production, consumption, and trade flows among importing and exporting in ASEAN 
Plus Three countries. The spatial dimension of RICEFLOW evaluates the quantity of grain reserves 
required by an importing or recipient country to obtain a new market equilibrium in an event of a 
production shortfall. As discussed earlier, the RICEFLOW model is the most flexible model wherein 
variables of interest can be either endogenous or exogenous based on user’s specification. Therefore 
modeling of stocks is easier in RICEFLOW when compared to other models. The RICEFLOW model is a 
spatial model that depicts the supply chain framework of global rice economy and therefore lends itself 






Table 3.1 Salient Characteristics of the AGRM, IGRM and RICEFLOW Models. 
Characteristics AGRM IGRM RICEFLOW 


















Research Life (Years) 20 1 10 
Baseline Projections 10 -15 20 - 30 5 -10 
Published Documentation Yes (Online) Internal Draft Yes (Online) 
Research Collaboration FAPRI IFPRI-IMPACT AGRM 
Modeling Update Regular Ongoing Development Regular 











No. of Countries/Regions 45 28 62+ 
Intra Regional 
Disaggregation 
Partial Yes No 
Data Cycle (Year) Marketing Marketing/Calendar Marketing 
Date Updates Macro data is updated 
once a year  while S&D 
can potentially be 
updated monthly 
Need or project 
specific updates 
Updates are 
subject to data 
availability 
and project needs. 
current data/AGRM 
update to 2008 
Partial Equilibrium Model Yes Yes Yes 
Spatial or Non-Spatial Model Non-Spatial Non-Spatial Spatial 
Dynamic or Static  Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic/Static 
Deterministic Estimates Yes Yes Yes 
Stochastic Capability Yes No Yes 
Production Theory Profit maximization 
subject to production 
constraint (MR=MC) 
Profit maximization 







Production Specification  Double log  or Linear Double log or Linear Leontief, CD or 
CES 
Production Estimates Yield x Area Harvested Yield x Area 
Harvested 
Disaggregated by 
stage of processing  
Consumer Level  Utility maximization subjected to budget constraints 
Trade Estimates Net Trade & Total 
Trade 
Net Trade Bilateral and Total 
Trade 
Source: AGRM, RICEFLOW and IRRI Model Documents 
                                                          




3.1 The RICEFLOW Model 
The RICEFLOW35 model is a partial equilibrium model that depicts the framework of the global rice 
economy. The software which is used to run the model simulation is GEMPACK (General Equilibrium 
Modeling Package). The model disaggregates rice trade into 9 distinct products based on type and 
degree of milling (table 3.2). The unique attribute of the RICEFLOW model is its ability to estimate 
bilateral trade flow impacts of regional and global trade agreements especially preferential trade 
agreements. Similarly the model can be used to study impacts of technological innovation, climate 
change, food security, and supply chain analysis. The RICEFLOW model is an annual model and all 
estimates of results are on an annual basis. The model uses data from FAO, COMTRADE, and USDA 
and other national trade databases (Thailand, India, and Vietnam) and the structural elasticity estimates 
from the Arkansas Global Rice Model (elasticities). The model is flexible in its scope and for this study 
covers 6036 countries. The model is updated regularly and the output can be estimated deterministically 
as well as stochastically. The model can be used for dynamic analysis relying upon a recursive 
specification of the previous year's solution providing a forward feeding market solution. The model at the 
producer level is based on profit maximization subject to a zero profit production constraint 
(costs=revenues). While the functional form is flexible, for the analysis of this study, production has a 
specification as Leontief37. At the consumer level the utility maximization is subject to a budget constraint. 
The RICEFLOW model is updated to 2009 actual calendar year data. 
Table 3.2 Product Distinction in RICEFLOW Model by Type and Degree of Milling 
Rice Type Long Grain Medium Grain Aromatic 
Degree of Milling Paddy Paddy Paddy 
 Brown Brown Brown 
Milled Milled Milled 
Source: Durand and Wailes, (2010) 
                                                          
35The RICEFLOW model is developed by Alvaro Durand-Morat and Eric Wailes (2010). For more details 
see online documentation at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/92010/2/RICEFLOW%20model%20documentation%20SP%2003
%202010.pdf 
36List of 60 countries is presented in table 3.0 of the appendix.  





The expected results (a priori) with release of stocks will result in a decrease in the retail price, and also 
decreases in consumption and imports. The schematics of the RICEFLOW model are presented in figure 
3.1 which gives details where in the model, benchmark and scenario analysis is conducted.  
Figure 3.1 RICEFLOW Model Schematics with Benchmark and Scenario 
Activity A (e.g. L.G Hybrid Rice)















Shock to Land Productivity (Benchmark) 
Release of APTERR Stocks (Scenario) 
 
The results presented in chapter four are divided into two sections. The first section provides deterministic 
results followed by stochastic results in the second section. In order to simplify the results it is important to 
understand the RICEFLOW model with respect to interpretation of baseline, benchmark and scenario 
results. 
3.2 Deterministic Analysis 
The RICEFLOW baseline result is a disaggregated representation of APT rice economies as of 2009. The 
production, consumption and trade flows for every APT country are represented in equilibrium in the 
RICEFLOW model.  
Benchmark: The benchmark results in the RICEFLOW simulation are generated by imposing a production 
shock to the 2009 baseline. There are two benchmarks based on how the production variable is shocked 





deterministic production shock is restricted to one country while the stochastic benchmark has stochastic 
production shocks (reflecting a more realistic representation of the market environment) to all APT 
countries based on estimates of historically correlated yields in APT countries. The stochastic benchmark 
has a production shock (on yields reflected as land efficiency (output per unit of land) of member 
countries) imposed on the baseline to generate a climatic event for policy analysis of the APTERR. The 
different levels of production shock (shortfalls in output per unit of land) in the RICEFLOW model in the 
deterministic benchmark are set at 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 percent. The deterministic benchmark production 
shocks capture the effectiveness of APTERR to generate estimates of rising rice prices in a country 
where there is a range of production shortfalls from 2 to 10 percent. The purpose of the benchmark 
results are to portray the market outcomes with the APTERR. 
Scenarios: The scenario results introduce the APTERR framework which is then evaluated relative to the 
benchmark results with regard to price stabilization and welfare of the consumers. 
3.3 Stochastic Analysis 
The policy and market analysis in the RICEFLOW model is conducted in a comparative static (equilibrium 
displacement) framework in which policies and other constraints are relaxed at same time or in series 
depending on the research objective. As mentioned earlier the baseline projection incorporates current 
macroeconomic policy variables and average weather conditions as explained in the stochastic 
benchmark section below. 
3.31 Stochastic Benchmark 
The stochastic benchmark in RICEFLOW is based on an empirical distribution of stochastic means of 
yields. The benchmark of the RICEFLOW model is generated by changes in yield (output per unit of land) 
where differences between actual mean and stochastic mean are expressed in percentage terms (figure 
3.2). The stochastic benchmark is developed based on the random draws from an empirical probability 
distribution function using historical yield data for the Philippines that captures the variability in land 
productivity. The stochastic yields are used to represent changes in the agro climatic conditions which are 




associated with risks and uncertainties in rice production, which is a fundamental element in addressing 
food security in ASEAN countries.  A correlated empirical distribution is developed for historical yields 
(1979 – 2009) of the APT countries based on deviations from the 2009 yield. The empirical distributions 
and random draws are developed using a SIMETAR (Simulation & Econometrics to Analyze Risk), 
developed by Richardson, James, Schumann, and Feldman (2008). Finally, the RICEFLOW model is 
simulated for each 100 random draws of yields to develop a benchmark and later a proposed policy 
scenario (developed in the following section) to compare against the benchmark results. The stochastic 
output of the RICEFLOW model has its own advantages as it gives probability estimates rather than point 
estimates.  
Figure 3.2 CDF of Stochastic Input for Philippines rice yield output based on differences between actual 
and stochastic means 
 
3.4 Policy Scenario 
The policy scenario under consideration assumes actual trade flows of 2009 where in the APTERR rice 
stocks are released from Philippines mimicking the effect of APTERR stocks release in response to a 
production shortfall.  
3.41 Deterministic Scenario 
The policy scenario in RICEFLOW model is simulated by a release of APTERR stocks at 25, 50, 75 and 
100 percent38 of the total APTERR stocks commitment to address deterministic production shortfalls of 2, 
                                                          

























4, 6, 8,and 10 percent. The objective of the stated policy scenario is to evaluate the impact of APTERR in 
addressing price volatility in a country where APTERR stocks are released in different quantities at the 
different production shortfall percentages. The results in the deterministic scenario are restricted to the 
Philippines. The benchmark historical data of rice production (with yield being stochastic39) in the 
Philippines demonstrate that the probability of rice production shortfall in the Philippines greater than 6 
percent has not occurred from year 1979 to 2009 (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). Therefore production 
shocks in the model for deterministic scenario are restricted to 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 percent respectively to 
incorporate values below and above 6 percent of production shortfall. The higher production shock of 8 
and 10 percent in the model are used to estimate the impact on regional supply and demand of rice under 
extreme conditions. 
Figure 3.3 Benchmark variability of Paddy yield in the Philippines based on 100 Correlated Stochastic 
Yield Difference (1979 - 2009) 
 
3.42 Stochastic Scenario 
All stochastic results are based on the 100% (i.e 787,000 Mt) release of APTERR stocks in the 
Philippines in response to stochastic production shock in all the APT countries. In order to evaluate the 
impact of APTERR on food security the results are restricted to major rice importing and exporting 
countries in ASEAN. The major rice importers and exporters listed in the results are the Philippines, 
                                                          
39 The area harvested was not stochastic as majority of APT countries had a wide variation in area 





























Indonesia, and Malaysia as importers and Thailand and Vietnam as exporters. The results have a major 
emphasis on the Philippines as it is the largest importer of rice among ASEAN countries followed by 
Malaysia, and Indonesia (USDA, 2012). Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia account for about 75 percent 
of total rice imports among ASEAN countries (USDA, 2012). Therefore, this study has the case of the 
Philippines where APTERR stocks are released at different levels in response to deterministic and 
stochastic production shocks. The results incorporate the spillover effect of APTERR release in the 
Philippines and its impacts on major rice importing and exporting countries in the regional rice market. 
The task of APTERR is to address volatility in rice prices in ASEAN countries. Therefore, to assess the 
impact of APTERR on the ASEAN rice market it is important to know variables like  change in volume of 
imports in an importing country, change in retail prices of exporting and importing countries, and changes 
in demand for consumption. The quantity of stocks shocked in the scenario represents the actual size of 
the APTERR earmarked stocks. The discussions of results are restricted to four important food security 
variables: retail prices, level of production, volume of consumption by type of rice, and trade flows in APT 
countries. 
The price volatility is measured in terms of Standard Deviation of prices (SD) or Coefficient of Variation 
(CV). A literature review of previous studies that used standard deviation as a measure of price volatility is 
discussed below. Based on Blandford’s (1983) study on measures of volatility from 1971-1981 it was 
concluded that times series data for wheat and coarse grain within one standard deviation wheat and 
coarse grain prices fluctuated 27 percent and 17.6 percent, respectively. Similarly, using the standard 
deviation for the rate of change in real prices Kinoshita (1994) concluded that price variability for grains 
and soybeans remained below 10 percent in the 1950s and 1960s but increased to 20 percent in 1980s 
and 1990s. Based on analysis by Moledina et al. (2004) of the time series data from 1957 to 2001 oil is 
the most price volatile commodity followed by sugar. The study uses standard deviation as a measure of 
volatility to analyze role of APTERR in reducing price volatility at different level of production shortfall in 
the Philippines. A study by Briones, Durand, Wailes, and Chavez (2012) which evaluated the impact of 
the APTERR on a monthly basis concluded that the wholesale price in China and retail price in Indonesia 
of long grain white rice decrease within the month of the production shock by 7 and 10.5 percent with 




shortfall of 5 percent in both countries. The same study concluded that a production shortfall of 5 percent 
in China and Indonesia there is a decrease in the volume of consumption of long grain white rice by 3.8 
Mmt ( 3.2 percent) and 1.6 Mmt (3.8 percent) respectively. The Briones et al., (2012) study using 
RICEFLOW estimated that imports due to 5 percent shortfall of production will increase imports in 






Chapter 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results presented in chapter 4 are divided into two major sections; deterministic and stochastic. The 
results are further subdivided into baseline, benchmark and scenarios. The baseline results are in metric 
tons for quantity and local currency for prices. In deterministic analysis the results for benchmark and 
scenarios are represented in percentage changes from baseline levels. In stochastic analysis the results 
are compared between benchmark baseline and scenario. The results and discussion focus on four 
important variables: retail prices, production, consumption, and imports in Philippines and selected 
ASEAN countries. These variables are relevant indicators for assessing price volatility and management 
of grain reserves.  
4.1 Deterministic Results 
The baseline in the deterministic analysis has no production shock to any variable in the RICEFLOW 
model. The benchmark in the deterministic analysis is change in rice production (production shock) in the 
Philippines and scenario analysis is release of APTERR stocks in the Philippines to compensate for 
production shortfall. The difference between benchmark and scenario is assessing the impact of APTERR 
release. The deterministic results of the benchmark and APTERR release scenarios give the point 
estimates and are expressed in percentages. In order to summarize results at different production 
shortfall (2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 percent) we restrict our discussion to 6 percent production shortfall and assess 
its impact on retail prices, consumption, and imports in the Philippines with different quantity of APTERR 
release. Similarly, spillover effects of APTERR on selected ASEAN countries with respect to change in 
retail prices, consumption and imports are discussed with respect to 6 percent production shortfall in the 
Philippines and 100 percent release of APTERR in Philippines. 
4.11 Impact on Retail Price in Philippines 
In 2009, the retail price of long grain white rice (LGW) in the Philippines was 30.73 peso per kg (FAO, 
2009). A production shock of 6 percent in the Philippines increases the retail price of rice to 31.98 peso 
per kg (4.07 percent), In order to address increase in retail price of rice a 100 percent release of APTERR 
stocks (787,000 Mt) will restrict  increase in retail price of rice to 30.99 peso per kg (0.85 percent). The 




and with (scenario) release of APTERR are represented in figure 4.1. The APTERR stocks are effective 
to decrease the retail price below the baseline at 2 percent of production shortfall with 50, 75, and 100 
percent release of APTERR stocks. At 4 percent production shortfall only 100 percent release of 
APTERR stock will decrease the retail price below the baseline. The percent change in retail price of 
Long Grain White (LGW) rice on annual basis is summarized in appendix table 4.0. 
Figure 4.1 Change in Retail Prices of LGW rice in the Philippines without and with APTERR release 
 
 
The rise in retail price in the Philippines at different production shortfall and release of APTERR stocks in 
curbing the price rise when evaluated using an annual price framework has a huge implication for food 
security based on two important facts. First, rice consumption in Philippines in 2009 was 123 kg per 
person, one of the highest among all rice consuming countries in the world40. Second, consumers in the 
Philippines spend a large share of their income on rice when compared to other food items (BAS, 2011). 
Therefore, based on per capita  rice consumption and income spend on purchasing rice by consumers in 
the Philippines a marginal impact on retail price in Philippines of the APTERR as seen in the empirical 
analysis has a significant role to address hunger in low income households. According to Bureau of 
Agriculture Statistics (BAS) low income households depend on rice as a sole source of dietary source 
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(BAS, 2011). The optimal management of APTERR stocks can be based on the following estimate that 
annual retail price in Philippines increases by 0.25 peso per kg for every 2 percent decrease in production 
and the release of different levels of APTERR stocks results in an annual price reduction of 0.8%. 
4.12 Impact on Retail Prices in other ASEAN Countries 
The results from table 4.1 indicate that a production short fall of 6 percent in Philippines would increase 
retail prices in Vietnam and Malaysia by 1.31 and 0.93 percent respectively. However, 100 percent 
release of APTERR would suppress retail price in both countries. There is a marginal impact on other 
countries like Indonesia and Thailand which means that APTERR has little spillover effect on other 
countries. Based on these results it can be argued that the APTERR stocks have a marginal stabilizing 
effect on retail prices in other ASEAN countries. The retail price in Vietnam increases as Philippines is the 
largest importer of Vietnamese rice. Therefore in absence of APTERR stock release, the Philippines will 
compensate for its production shortfall by increasing imports from Vietnam that will result in an increase in 
the retail price in Vietnam.  
Table 4.1 Impact on Long Grain Retail Prices in selected ASEAN countries 
Country Baseline Benchmark Scenario (Change from 
Benchmark) 
 Local Currency (LC)/Mt Change in Percent 
Exporters 
Thailand 16,894* 0.42 0.08 
Vietnam 8,792,000 1.31 0.26 
Importers 
Indonesia 6,668,730 0.04 0.01 
Malaysia 850* 0.93 0.19 
Philippines 30,730 4.07 0.85 
*Wholesale price is a proxy for retail prices in Thailand and Malaysia. 
4.13 Impact on Long Grain Rice Production in Member ASEAN Countries 
The results in this section are restricted to other member ASEAN countries as we evaluate the impact of 
the 6 percent production shock in the Philippines on other ASEAN countries. The results indicate there is 
an increase of 0.33% and 0.11%, in long grain rice production in Vietnam and Thailand, respectively, in 
order to meet the import demand of Philippines when there is a production shortfall of 6 percent in the 
benchmark result. However, under the scenario of a 100 percent release of APTERR stocks there is only 




Because of the higher prices, producers in other rice importing nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia 
also increase their domestic rice production, very slightly by 0.01 percent in Indonesia and by 0.19 
percent in Malaysia. With domestic prices stabilizing as APTERR stocks are released at 100 percent, 
production in Indonesia returns to baseline levels and slightly higher at 0.04 percent than baseline in 
Malaysia. 
Table 4.2 Impact on Long Grain Rice Production in selected ASEAN countries 
Country Baseline Benchmark Scenario (Change from Benchmark) 
 1000 Metric tons Percent change 
Exporters 
Thailand 21,421 0.11 0.02 
Vietnam 25,943 0.33 0.07 
Importers 
Indonesia 42,954 0.01 0.00 
Malaysia 1,675 0.19 0.04 
 
4.14 Impact on Long Grain White Consumption in the Philippines 
Based on the 2009 baseline data, the annual consumption of rice in the Philippines was 12.13 Mmt. In the 
benchmark results the annual domestic consumption will decrease to 12.01 Mmt with 6 percent 
production shortfall. However with the 100 percent release of APTERR the consumption levels of rice at 6 
percent production shortfall will be 12.10 Mmt (See figure 4.2). The percent change in the Philippines 
consumption of long grain white rice on an annual basis in the benchmark and in the scenarios of 
alternative release percentages of APTERR stock release at various production shortfall levels is reported 




Figure 4.2 Change in Consumption of LGW rice in the Philippines without and with APTERR release 
 
4.15 Impact on Long Grain White Rice Consumption in selected ASEAN Countries. 
Consumption of long grain white rice decreases in all of the ASEAN countries reported in Table 4.3 for 
the benchmark as a spillover result of higher domestic retail prices. However, with the release of APTERR 
stocks there is little or no change in consumption for these other ASEAN countries. 
Table 4.3 Impact on Long Grain Rice Consumption in selected ASEAN countries 
Country Baseline Benchmark Scenario (Change from Benchmark) 
 1000 Metric Tons Change in percent 
Exporters 
Thailand 12,965  -0.02 0.00 
Vietnam 19,934 -0.26 -0.05 
Importers  
Indonesia 42,183  -0.01 0.00 
Malaysia 2,201  -0.27 -0.05 
Philippines 12,132  -0.98 -0.21 
 
4.16 Impact on Imports of Long Grain White Rice in the Philippines 
In 2009, total rice imports in the Philippines were 1.86 Mmt (accounting for 15 percent of total domestic 
rice consumption). Any increased import of rice at higher prices in the Philippines to address food security 
as seen in 2008 has impact on the national economy as value foreign exchange is involved in purchase 
of rice from the International market. The loss of valuable foreign exchange results in lack government 
investment in other productive sectors of the economy.  In the benchmark analysis, long grain white rice 
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with the 100 percent release of APTERR stocks imports are restricted to 1.91 Mmt. The decreases in 
imports in percentages from the benchmark level are presented in appendix table 6.0. In general there is 
a decrease in imports of rice with the release of APTERR. However the APTERR stocks are not adequate 
to meet the decrease in production above 6 percent on an annual basis.  
Figure 4.3 Change in Imports of LGW rice in the Philippines without and with annual APTERR release 
 
4.17 Impact on Long Grain White Rice Imports on selected ASEAN Countries 
A production shortfall of 6 percent in Philippines results in increased imports of 5.71 percent in Malaysia 
in absence of APTERR but release of APTERR stocks results in only 1.12 percent increase in imports. 
Philippines and Malaysia are major importers of long grain white rice from Vietnam and Thailand. 
Therefore a production shortfall of 6 percent in Philippines will increase imports of white rice in Malaysia 
from Vietnam and Thailand to secure imports as Philippines will increase imports by 25 percent in 
absence of APTERR. However, imports in Indonesia decrease by 1.58 percent in absence of APTERR 
while imports are restricted to 0.32 percent with APTERR stocks. The imports in Philippines increase by 
25 percent with production shortfall of 6 percent but the 100 percent release of APTERR stocks restrict 
the increased imports to 5 percent.  
Table 4.4 Change in Import of Long Grain White Rice in selected ASEAN countries 
Country Baseline Benchmark Scenario (Change from Benchmark) 
Importers 1000 Metric Tons Change in percent 
Indonesia 259 -1.58 -0.32 
Malaysia 256 5.71 1.12 
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4.2 Stochastic Results 
In the following section a discussion on the impact of APTERR stocks on retail prices, consumption and 
imports in Philippines and other ASEAN countries using a stochastic framework is presented. The 
stochastic benchmark baseline has a production shock above 2 percent in the Philippines. The scenario 
has 100 percent release of APTERR stocks in the Philippines (787,000 Mt). The difference between 
benchmark baseline and scenario is the net impact of APTERR stocks. 
4.21 Impact on Retail Prices 
Retail price variability is an important indicator of food security. The stochastic simulation generates the 
likelihood of production shortfall based on historic variability in yields and consequently the distribution of 
prices. The stochastic simulation results in table 4.5 represents percentage changes in the retail prices of 
long grain white rice with the release of the APTERR stocks in the Philippines. The overall results indicate 
that the largest decrease in the mean retail price of rice is in Philippines by 3.11 percent followed by 
Vietnam 0.92 percent, Malaysia 0.48 and Thailand 0.23 percent 
Table 4.5 Percent change in Retail Price of Long Grain White Rice for selected ASEAN countries  
Country Benchmark Percentile Scenario Percentile Change 
 Mean SD 10th 90th Mean SD 10th 90th Mean SD 
Indonesia 2.40 9.10 -7.04 18.37 2.37 9.09 -7.06 18.30 -0.03 -0.01 
Malaysia 0.96 3.44 -2.55 5.19 0.49 3.08 -2.58 4.24 -0.48 -0.36 
Philippines 3.16 3.34 -0.48 7.84 0.05 3.00 -3.30 4.25 -3.11 -0.34 
Thailand 1.19 3.69 -3.59 6.55 0.96 3.73 -3.81 6.61 -0.23 0.04 
Vietnam 1.41 4.36 -3.19 7.06 0.49 4.15 -3.95 5.86 -0.92 -0.21 
In general the decrease in the retail price in countries other than Philippines is due to the trade flow which 
is endogenous in the model. The trade flows among major ASEAN countries is presented in appendix 
table 2.0. Vietnam and Thailand are major exporters of long grain white rice to Philippines. Vietnam is the 
largest exporter of long grain white rice to the Philippines. In 2009, Vietnam exported 1.7 Mmt of long 
grain white rice to Philippines. Therefore with the release of 787,000 mt of rice in the Philippines imports 
from Vietnam will be reduced causing a decrease in the retail price of rice in Vietnam. In the case of 
Malaysia, larger exports from Vietnam and Thailand will decrease the retail price of rice in Malaysia as 
APTERR stocks reduce imports in Philippines. In general, release of 787,000 mt of rice stocks in the 




retail prices in most of the ASEAN countries. The retail prices of the LGW rice in the Philippines increases 
by 3.16 percent in response to the stochastic production shock in all the APT countries presented in table 
4.5. But, with the release of APTERR stocks in the Philippines the average retail price of LGW rice 
decreases by 3.11 percent. About 10 percent of the time the price will be lower than 3.30 percent of the 
benchmark price and 10 percent of the time the retail price will be higher by 4.25 percent. As far as 
addressing price volatility using APTERR is concerned the SD as reported in the baseline and scenario 
will decrease from 3.34 to 3.00 with 100 percent release of APTERR stocks thereby reducing volatility of 
prices.            
 The appendix table 7.0 represent change in retail price of rice in the Philippines due to a 
stochastic production shock and its associated standard deviation with release of APTERR stocks in the 
Philippines. The results indicate that higher standard deviation is observed at higher prices in absence of 
APTERR stocks but with the release of APTERR stocks there is marginal decrease in prices and its 
associated standard deviation.         
 The RICEFLOW model as mentioned earlier disaggregates countries into the medium, long grain 
and fragrant rice producing countries. The table 8.0 in appendix outlines the change in the retail price of 
medium grain and fragrant rice in selected ASEAN countries. The release of APTERR reserves would 
have negligible to no impact in the medium grain rice markets of the APT countries. Japan is the only 
country that has a marginal increase in the retail price of medium grain rice in response to the APTERR 
release in the Philippines. In case of the medium grain rice market the baseline retail price in the 
Philippines on average increases by 0.03 percent and about 10 percent of times the prices will be lower 
1.42 percent and 10 percent of times the prices will be higher by 2.20 percent. However with release of 
APTERR there is little change in the average retail price of medium grain rice.    
 The retail price of fragrant rice in the selected APT countries remains unchanged due to following 
reasons. First, there is very little consumption of fragrant rice in the Philippines. Second, the total export 
of fragrant from Thailand to Philippines in 2009 was only 8,471 Mt. Therefore releases of APTERR 




4.22 Impact on Volume of Consumption 
The consumption of the LGW rice in the Philippines will increase by 0.76 percent with release of APTERR 
stocks in Philippines. There is an increase in consumption of rice for all major long grain consuming 
countries like Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand with the release of APTERR in the Philippines. As far as 
medium grain and fragrant rice consumption is concerned there is either marginal decrease or no change 
in consumption. To summarize the overall consumption results demonstrate a minimal change in 
consumption of ASEAN countries with the release of APTERR. 
Table 4.6 Percent change in Long Grain, White Rice Consumption for selected ASEAN countries 
Country Benchmark Percentile Scenario Percentile Change 
 Mean SD 10th 90th Mean SD 10th 90th Mean SD 
Indonesia -0.27 1.20 -2.33 1.03 -0.27 1.20 -2.33 1.03 0.00 0.00 
Malaysia -0.14 0.78 -0.91 0.78 -0.01 0.63 -0.68 0.73 0.14 -0.15 
Philippines -0.65 0.51 -1.44 0.08 0.11 0.46 -0.64 0.73 0.76 -0.05 
Thailand -0.03 0.09 -0.15 0.08 -0.02 0.09 -0.13 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Vietnam -0.26 0.85 -1.36 0.65 -0.08 0.82 -1.13 0.81 0.18 -0.03 
4.23 Impact on Total Imports  
As a results of stochastic production shock rice imports in Philippines and Indonesia increase by 9.43 
10.94 percent respectively. Table 4.7 represents change in total imports in selected ASEAN rice importing 
countries due to release of 787,000 Mt of APTERR stocks. The stochastic results indicate that imports in 
Indonesia with release of 100 percent of APTERR stocks increase by 0.94 and in Malaysia imports 
decrease by 0.08 percent. However, total rice imports in Philippines decrease by 11 percent with 100 
percent release of APTERR. There is marginal effect on imports of other major rice importing countries in 
ASEAN region when 100 percent APTERR stocks are released in the Philippines.  
Table 4.7 Change in Total Rice Imports of selected ASEAN countries  
Country Benchmark Percentile Scenario Percentile Change 
 Mean SD 10th  90th  Mean SD 10th  90th  Mean SD 
Indonesia 10.94 41.43 -31.28 77.83 11.88 41.75 -32.39 80.07 0.94 0.32 
Malaysia 0.71 4.26 -4.34 6.88 0.63 4.08 -4.90 5.87 -0.08 -0.18 
Philippines 9.43 4.56 4.05 15.83 -1.57 4.46 -6.60 4.84 -11.00 -0.10 
 
4.3 Economic Analysis of the APTERR 
This section of the chapter will discuss institutional economic and political economy analysis of ASEAN 
APTERR framework.          




imports. Based on FAO statistics, Philippines imported 1.85 Mmt of rice from Vietnam, Thailand and other 
countries to meet its demand for domestic consumption (FAO, 2009c). The 2008 rice price spike and 
events of panic buying of rice among importers that followed in its aftermath has cautioned policymakers 
in Philippines that total reliance on international trade to meet its food security is every risky. Similarly, the 
thinness of rice trade (only 5 to 7 percent of world rice production is exported), with about 84 percent of 
exports concentrated in five countries (Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan, India, and the US), growing demand 
for rice from African countries and climate change threats to major import sources has led the 
policymakers in Philippines to strive to achieve self-sufficiency by 2013 (Department of Agriculture, 2011).
 To address food security concerns as well as gain public confidence in government’s ability to 
feed its population there is always an incentive for a populist government in the Philippines to undertake 
expensive programs that promote self-sufficiency in rice production at the expense of trade. The 
Philippines has limited potential to increase its production due to limited land area for expansion of rice 
production, lack of infrastructure (irrigation, and transportation ) and increased demand for rice due to  
high population growth (Dawe et al., 2006). The national approach to address food security in the 
Philippines is to increase production via increase in productivity and to be self-sufficient by 2013 and 
beyond (Department of Agriculture, 2011). Therefore in the Philippines, the Food Staples Self-sufficiency 
Roadmap (FSSR) project coordinated by Department of Agriculture is to achieve rice self-sufficiency by 
increasing productivity and farm mechanization, reducing post-harvest and food waste losses, and 
diversifying diet to low priced food crops. Unfortunately, all the goals outlined in FSSR by the government 
of Philippines are long terms objectives and do not address the issue of price volatility which is a short-
term problem. Therefore, the Philippines needs APTERR or the National Food Authority (NFA) to meets it 
food security needs on short term basis. According to Intal and Garcia (2005), the price stabilization or 
addressing price volatility at any cost is an expensive proposition to the Philippines as costs associated 
with stabilizing food prices for NFA in 1990 were higher than investment in agricultural research and 
development or irrigation. According to AGILE41 (2000) and Intal and Garcia (2005) the National Food 
Authority (NFA), the state trading enterprising responsible for providing price support for farmers and 
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price ceiling for consumers has failed in its objective to address food security concerns of the Philippines. 
The NFA procurement of stocks via imports is expensive if there is a regional calamity such as production 
shortfall in major rice exporting countries then there is an emotional decision to procure large stocks at 
higher prices to address food security. The role of the NFA should be to manage the emergency rice 
reserves program and let the private sector be (commercial enterprises) involved in imports, storage and 
distribution of rice (Intal & Garcia, 2005). Therefore, the APTERR can address food security concerns of 
the Philippines on an emergency basis in the short term as there is the commitment of 300,000 Mt stocks 
from Plus Three countries to the ASEAN APTERR framework which, is equivalent to almost three months 
of total rice imports in the Philippines. The policy option of reliance on enhanced trade to address price 
volatility can be a reliable option only if ASEAN exporters like Thailand and Vietnam can assure major 
importers like the Philippines and Indonesia that, if there is no ban on rice exports in future, then 
importers can forgo their self-sufficiency targets which are expensive and inefficient (Clarete, 2012).
 The pilot project operations of the APTERR were funded by donations from member countries 
(Japan and Thailand). As per Lin’s (2009) estimate the economics of ICGR (Internationally Coordinated 
Grain Reserves) are too high and it would cost about 1.05 billion USD a year. However, according to 
Clarete (2012) the economic cost of operating APTERR annually is over 3 million USD.A permanent fund 
contributed by member states or donations of funds from international agencies are essential for 
sustainable operation of the APTERR. Therefore, the idea of having an APTERR fund as mentioned in 
the APTERR charter is encouraging and such an APTERR fund will ensure financial sustainability of the 
organization. ASEAN Food Security Information System (AFSIS) an integral part of the ASEAN APTERR 
food security framework is crucial in operation of the APTERR. The information sharing among members 
will make stakeholders aware of food stocks and curb herding behavior of individual stakeholders in an 
event of crises (Wright, 2009). Likewise, coordination of a change in food policies among major rice 
importers and exporters will strengthen the ASEAN APTERR framework (APTERR, 2011). The 
experience with the operation of the AERR which preceded the APTERR that addressed humanitarian 
(tier 3) and forward contacts (tier 2) are important to make grain reserves more efficient with respect to its 
operation (Clarete, 2012). The APTERR reserves under first tier (forward contract) and second tier 




4.4 Political and Operational Challenges for Regional Grain Reserves 
The objective of the APTERR is to address emergency and humanitarian needs of member ASEAN 
countries with no distortion in normal international rice trade (APTERR, 2011). The APT framework of 
cooperation from an institutional perspective has other agendas such as cooperation on the settlement of 
territorial disputes and promotion of ASEAN Plus Three free trade agreement that are likely to gather 
more traction or priority than the ASEAN Food Security framework. There is a lack of planning as to 
where the APTERR will be with respect to rule of operations and management of reserves. The APTERR 
agreement signed in October 2011 in Jakarta, Indonesia needs to be developed into a permanent 
operation module for addressing food emergencies in ASEAN countries. The two major policy 
interventions that have low cost implementation and high effectiveness  to addressing price volatility are 
trade facilitation and market information, whereas other major policy interventions such as use of reserve 
stocks has a medium level of implementation cost and low impact in addressing price volatility (Von 
Braun, 2009). All of the above three options are already part of the ASEAN Food Security Program 
(Clarete, 2012). The events like the 2008 price spike can be avoided, if the ASEAN APTERR framework 
addresses food security issues from a regional perspective with enhanced trade being the first policy 
option followed by the APTERR grain reserves as a second line of defense to address food security on 
short term basis in the regional rice market. To address the issue of food security in developing countries 
there are different forms of policy interventions, but the objectives of these programs is not same as 
addressing price volatility (Torero & Von Braun, 2009b). The effectiveness of the APTERR when 
compared to other forms of similar policy intervention such as ICGR (Lin, 2009), IGCA (Sarris, 2009) is it 
has medium cost of operation and high level of effectiveness in addressing price volatility (Von Braun & 
Torero, 2009b; Clarete, 2012).          
 The role of grain reserves is of paramount importance in developing countries from a food policy 
perspective and so is the role of the APTERR. Based on Wright and Cafiero’s (2011) argument, grain 
markets in advanced economies operate in a free market environment with no distortion, but there is an 
important challenge to such markets. When food supply is dependent on free markets or private storage 
an individual can have access to food supplies only if an individual has resources or funds, absence of 




developing countries and food banks in developed countries to address food security needs of individuals 
who do not have resources or funds to meet their food security needs. Therefore, national grain reserves 
must be maintained complementary to regional grain reserves as regional grain reserves are a short term 
response to local food crises (Wright & Cafiero, 2011). 
4.5 Challenges with Coordination of Grain Reserves 
The ICGR as proposed by Lin (2009) would have problems in coordination of its operation given the 
multi- national context of grain reserves. However, coordinating of rice reserves will not be a challenge as 
the rice market is highly concentrated and reserves can be highly effective in addressing price volatility 
(Timmer, 2009). To add further, if India and Pakistan (two major exporters of long grain rice in the 
international rice market) can be part of the APTERR ASEAN framework then this partnership of India 
and Pakistan in the APTERR reserve program can bolster the decision making and reserve capacity of 




Chapter 5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical analyses of results on the role of the APTERR as a policy tool to address price volatility in 
APT countries using the RICEFLOW model are presented in chapter 4. Based on the stochastic and 
deterministic results presented and discussed, the basic findings are that the role of APTERR in 
addressing ASEAN rice price volatility is limited. The stochastic results show that there is a decrease in 
the retail price of long grain white rice by 3.11 percent for a 100 percent release of APTERR stocks in 
Philippines following a 2 percent production shock. The deterministic results clearly indicate that reserves 
are not adequate to address price volatility at production shortfalls, above 4 percent. The results from the 
empirical analysis state that the APTERR are ideal to address short term emergency situations and are 
not adequate for addressing extreme price volatility.      
 Based on Timmer’s observation there are two major food crises every century, following every 
food crisis there are series of food policy related discussions, and workshops at regional and international 
levels outlining policy recommendations to address food security issues due to extreme price volatility. 
However, most of  the policy recommendations such as use of grain reserves, or increasing agricultural 
productivity or those highlighted in the High Level Panel of Expert’s (HLPE., 2011) report are partly or at 
least formally accepted or acknowledged by the government or group of governments. But there is a 
serious issue of lack of implementation due to two major problems. First there is a lack of political will to 
implement the policy recommendation. Such was the case for ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve Program 
(AERR) although it was adopted in 1979 with no actual operationalisation until 2003. The program was 
operational only after it was supported by additional stocks from Plus Three countries and financial 
assistance from Thailand and Japan. Second, an economic union such as ASEAN has other important 
issues such transnational security, territorial or trade disputes, and transnational terrorism that may gather 
much more traction or attention relative to food security and staple food price volatility. Therefore, any 
multilateral food security agreement like ASEAN APTERR if adopted or accepted by a group of countries 
can be either sidelined or kept on hold.  In general, domestic grain reserves operated by state trading 




end and subsidized food grain to consumers on other end. BULOG42 in Indonesia, BERNAS43 in 
Malaysia, and NFA in Philippines are examples of state trading enterprises in ASEAN countries. 
However, operation of a regional grain reserves is quite complex given the multilateral commitment of 
countries on rules and regulations with respect to operation of an organization. A successful regional 
grain reserve that can addresses food security needs, efficient management of stocks with a high level of 
government commitment, active participation of key stakeholders, and clearly defined rules on grain 
procurement and distribution. As far as APTERR is concerned rules on release, procurement and 
distribution of rice reserves are needed to be defined more clearly. Similarly, the organization needs a 
high level of government commitment from China and South Korea. In this study the analysis is based on 
the use of APTERR stocks to address different levels of production shocks in the Philippines. The results 
for Plus Three countries suggest that the role of Plus Three countries in addressing price volatility is 
based on what type of rice (medium or long grain) is committed to reserve, as the APT regional rice 
market is highly segmented by type of rice produced and consumed. Japan, and South Korea, produces 
and consumes medium grain rice while China, is a producer and consumer of both long grain and 
medium grain rice. Therefore, if the reserves committed to the APTERR by the China, Japan and South 
Korea are in medium grain rice then the role of reserves in addressing price volatility in long grain rice 
consuming countries is unknown. However, there is a high probability of WTO long grain rice imports from 
Japan and South Korea to be committed to APTERR stocks to address food emergencies in ASEAN 
countries. The commitment as well as priority of member countries to the APTERR stocks from a political 
economy perspective is full of uncertainty as there are other areas of co-operation such as the 
cooperation on free trade and settlement of territorial dispute by peaceful means that gain priority over 
cooperation on addressing food security.       
 The APTERR as an organization stated as a pilot project in 1979. The organization agreement 
was officially into force on 12 July 2012 with the APTERR Secretariat established on 29 March 2013 in 
Bangkok Thailand. The first official APTERR council ministerial meeting was held on 28 March, 2012 in 
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Bangkok after a period of almost 10 years since the inception of pilot project in 2003. A total of 13,000 Mt 
of APTERR stocks were released during the implementation of the pilot project. The disaggregated total 
13,000 Mt of rice stocks are as follows: 3,000 Mt of rice was distributed to Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Myanmar and the Philippines as a group while 10,000 Mt of rice was distributed from Vietnam to the 
Philippines. Additional details on the total release of APTERR stocks is presented in appendix table 8.0. 
Both of these releases were an immediate response to natural calamities. Such releases are critical in 
addressing hunger on short term basis, but reliance on the adequacy of APTERR stocks to address price 
volatility as witnessed in 2008 is not recommended. Furthermore, based on the pilot project experience, 
release of APTERR stocks are suitable for natural calamities that span one or another region/ province. 
But they are not suitable for an entire nation. A small production shock of about 2 to 4 percent is a 
reasonably acceptable production shock for the release of APTERR stocks. But APTERR stocks are not 
geared to massive production shocks of 5 percent or greater.     
 The policy recommendations are divided into two sections. Based on the discussion in chapter 4 
there are two policy recommendations based on a food policy and political economy perspective. From a 
political economy perspective, China, Japan and South Korea are the largest contributors to the APTERR 
stocks. But their participation is minimal as far as policy making in the APTERR is concerned with 
exception of Japan. Therefore, China, and South Korea should be more active participants in the ASEAN 
APTERR food security framework.  Second, based on the current territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea between APT members, China, the largest contributor to the APTERR stocks has growing nationalist 
interests that would undermine its commitment to the APTERR. Similarly, there may be a contest for 
leadership of the APTERR between China and Japan in near future. The future of APT framework of 
cooperation is still unclear whether if it will develop into an organization like ASEAN or APEC (Sukuzi, 
2004). At present ASEAN has shown its support to host APT unit within the ASEAN Secretariat 
(www.asean.org). Based on Briones at al., (2012), regional grain reserves are too small to reduce price of 
the domestic market on an annual basis in case of large production shortfalls. Major rice exporters such 
as Thailand and Vietnam should make commitments equal to that of Plus Three countries and similarly 
major rice importers in ASEAN such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines should increase their 




argument for increasing the size of grain reserves is to offer policy option of grain reserves stocks will be 
released to address price volatility (even if they are not used) or in other words the use of grain reserves 
would be a policy leverage to reduce extreme price volatility if there is a production shortfall due to natural 
calamities or speculation in international or regional rice markets. There can be an extension of the 
APTERR with other regional grain reserves like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) grain reserves to have Asian Rice Reserves. The Asian Grain Reserves (a combination of 
APTERR and SAARC rice reserves) will involve all major rice producing and consuming countries in Asia. 
A similar proposal was discussed at UNCTAD in 1974 after first food crises of 1973/74 and recently in 
2011 the same proposal of 1974 was discussed by the G-20 countries to have an international grain 
reserves (Murphy, 2009).         
 A combination of short and long term strategy that addresses social, macro and structural policy 
constraints in the existing policy framework are needed to promote food security, poverty and hunger 
(ADB, 2012). As per Holmes (2008) the United Nations (UN) estimate that since the 1990s number of 
natural disasters worldwide has increased twofold and nine out of ten disasters are related to climate 
change. Therefore, grain reserves are a public insurance policy to combat climate change threats to 
agricultural production (Murphy, 2012b). The adoption of APTERR at the regional level is the best 
approach to stabilize prices, address food security, and the first step towards enhancing regional rice 
trade (ADB, 2009). 
 
Future Research  
The current RICEFLOW model used in assessing the impact of the APTERR to address price volatility in 
regional rice markets can be modified to create a new pseudo country that represents the supra national 
reserve APTERR and has linkages that capture the storage component or earmarked sector of  APTERR 
grain reserves in every APT countries. The current model distinguishes long grain and medium grain 
trade however; there are no specifics available for the earmarked commitment by member countries on 
long grain and medium grain rice that can be simulated differently from the current trade flows in the 




grain reserves required to address price volatility on monthly basis can be made if there is monthly of 







































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.0 World Bank Classification of APT Countries based Income in 2011. 
Low Income Low Middle Income High Middle Income High Income 
$1,025 or less $1,026 to $4,035 $4,036 to $12,475 $12,476 or more 
Cambodia Indonesia China Brunei 
Darussalam 
Myanmar Lao PDR Malaysia Japan 
 Philippines Thailand South Korea 
 Vietnam  Singapore 
Source: World Bank, 2011 
 
Table 2.0 Intra ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three Trade Flows RICEFLOW 2009 Database (Cont.) 
Rice Type Degree of Milling Exporter Importer Quantity in Mt 
Long Grain Paddy China Indonesia 5281 
Long Grain Paddy China Philippines 1864 
Long Grain Paddy China Vietnam 8827 
Long Grain Paddy Laos China 12536 
Long Grain Paddy Philippines Indonesia 358 
Total 28865 
Long Grain Brown Cambodia Malaysia 2102 
Long Grain Brown Laos China 4514 
Total 6616 
Long Grain White Laos Vietnam 12916 
Long Grain White Myanmar Malaysia 16712 
Long Grain White Myanmar Philippines 12837 
Long Grain White Myanmar Singapore 3584 
Long Grain White Myanmar Thailand 64807 
Long Grain White Thailand Brunei 5313 
Long Grain White Thailand Cambodia 21743 










































































































































Table 2.0 Intra ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three Trade Flows RICEFLOW 2009 Database. 
Long Grain White Thailand Hong Kong 103190 
Long Grain White Thailand Indonesia 219124 
Long Grain White Thailand Japan 267424 
Long Grain White Thailand Laos 46587 
Long Grain White Thailand Malaysia 50389 
Long Grain White Thailand Philippines 146916 
Long Grain White Thailand South Korea 15094 
Long Grain White Thailand Singapore 74453 
Long Grain White Thailand Thailand 7824 
Long Grain White Vietnam Brunei 5880 
Long Grain White Vietnam Cambodia 2411 
Long Grain White Vietnam China 17398 
Long Grain White Vietnam Hong Kong 43219 
Long Grain White Vietnam Indonesia 16536 
Long Grain White Vietnam Japan 4166 
Long Grain White Vietnam Malaysia 633505 
Long Grain White Vietnam Philippines 1708239 
Long Grain White Vietnam Singapore 334935 
Total 4053779 
Medium Grain Brown China Japan 8701 
Medium Grain Brown China South Korea 121355 
Medium Grain White China Hong Kong 40528 
Medium Grain White China Japan 73972 
Medium Grain White China South Korea 42066 
Medium Grain White China Singapore 2838 
Total 289460 
Fragrant White Thailand Brunei 26817 
Fragrant White Thailand China 125304 
Fragrant White Thailand Japan 3356 
Fragrant White Thailand Malaysia 111619 
Fragrant White Thailand Philippines 8471 
Fragrant White Thailand Singapore 113453 
Total 967940 
Source: RICEFLOW Database, 2009 
 
Table 3.0 List of Countries represented in the RICEFLOW Model (Cont.) 
Serial No. Countries ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three Member Countries 
1 Argentina  
2 Australia  
3 Bangladesh  
4 Belize  
5 Brazil  
6 Brunei ASEAN member 
7 Cambodia ASEAN member 
8 Canada  
9 Chile  
10 China ASEAN Plus Three member 





Table 3.0 List of Countries represented in the RICEFLOW Model.  
12 Costa Rica  
13 Cote d Ivoire  
14 Cuba  
15 Egypt  
16 El Salvador  
17 Ghana  
18 Guatemala  
19 Guyana  
20 Haiti  
21 Honduras  
22 Hong Kong  
23 India  
24 Indonesia ASEAN member 
25 Iran  
26 Iraq  
27 Japan ASEAN Plus Three member 
28 Laos ASEAN member 
29 Malaysia ASEAN member 
30 Mexico  
31 Myanmar ASEAN member 
32 New Zealand  
33 Nicaragua  
34 Nigeria  
35 Pakistan  
36 Panama  
37 Peru  
38 Philippine ASEAN member 
39 South Korea ASEAN Plus Three member 
40 Saudi Arabia  
41 Senegal  
42 Sierra Leone  
43 Singapore ASEAN member 
44 South Africa  
45 Thailand ASEAN member 
46 UAE  
47 Uruguay  
48 USA  
49 Vietnam ASEAN member  
50 OCARI (Other Caribbean)  
51 OME (Other Middle East)   
52 EU27 (European Union 27)  
53 OAFR (Other Africa)  
54 OEUR (Other European)  
55 ONAFR (Other North Africa)  
56 ONASIA (Other North Asia)  
57 OOCEA ( Other Oceania)  
58 OSAM (Other South America)  
59 OSEASIA (Other South East Asia)  
60 OWAFR (Other West Africa)  
Countries listed from serial no.50 to 60 are aggregated together based on geographic regions 





Table 4.0 Change in Retail Price in percent on Annual basis with and without release of APTERR. 
 Release of APTERR Stocks in Percent 
Shortfall in Production  0 25 50 75 100 
2 1.32 0.54 -0.24 -1.00 -1.75 
4 2.68 1.88 1.08 0.30 -0.47 
6 4.07 3.25 2.44 1.64 0.85 
8 5.49 4.65 3.82 3.01 2.20 
10 6.93 6.08 5.24 4.41 3.58 
Source: Author 
 
Table 5.0 Change in Consumption in percent on Annual basis with and without release of APTERR. 
 Release of APTERR Stocks in Percent 
Shortfall in Production  0 25 50 75 100 
2 -0.32 -0.13 0.06 0.25 0.44 
4 -0.65 -0.46 -0.27 -0.07 0.12 
6 -0.98 -0.79 -0.59 -0.40 -0.21 
8 -1.31 -1.12 -0.92 -0.73 -0.54 
10 -1.64 -1.45 -1.25 -1.06 -0.87 
Source: Author 
 
Table 6.0 Change in Imports in percent on Annual basis with and without release of APTERR. 
 
Table 7.0 Impact on Philippines Long Grain White Rice Retail Prices (Peso per Kg) 
APTERR  Mean Standard  Deviation Coefficient  of Variation 10th 50th 90th 
Percent    Percentile 
0  31.70 1.03 0.0324 30.58 31.48 33.14 
25  31.47 1.00 0.0318 30.36 31.24 32.86 
50  31.23 0.98 0.0313 30.14 31.00 32.58 
75  30.97 0.95 0.0307 29.93 30.76 32.31 
100  30.75 0.92 0.0300 29.72 30.52 32.04 
Baseline Price (2009) in Philippines 30.73 Peso per Kg  Source: Author and FAO, 2009 
 
  
 Release of APTERR Stocks in Percent 
Shortfall in Production  0 25 50 75 100 
2 4.55 1.84 -0.81 -3.38 -5.91 
4 9.28 6.47 3.72 1.03 -1.61 
6 14.19 11.29 8.44 5.65 2.90 
8 19.27 16.28 13.33 10.45 7.60 





Table 8.0 Change in Retail Price of Medium Grain White Rice and Fragrant White Rice in APT countries 
 Benchmark Percentile Scenario Percentile Change 
Medium Grain Rice 
 Mean SD 10th 90th Mean SD 10th 90th Mean SD 
China -0.10 10.10 -10.28 12.32 -0.02 10.05 -10.27 12.28 0.08 -0.05 
Japan 2.63 8.21 -5.28 13.65 2.60 8.19 -5.28 13.56 -0.02 -0.02 
Philippines 0.03 1.38 -1.42 2.02 0.03 1.41 -1.44 1.99 0.00 0.03 
S. Korea -0.16 4.50 -6.11 6.48 -0.18 4.51 -6.12 6.45 -0.02 0.01 
Fragrant Rice 
Malaysia 0.94 4.14 -4.22 7.00 0.91 4.14 -4.25 6.91 -0.03 0.00 
Philippines 0.97 4.25 -4.33 7.20 0.95 4.26 -4.36 7.11 -0.03 0.01 
Thailand 1.06 4.62 -4.70 7.82 1.03 4.62 -4.73 7.72 -0.03 0.00 
Vietnam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author 
 
Table 8.1 Release of APTERR stocks released from December 2004 to December 2012 
Country  Program Duration Total Quantity (Mt) Beneficiaries 
 Lao PDR Poverty Alleviation Dec 2004 
– Jun 
2005 
13.37 87 households and 
students in Vientiane 
province 
Indonesia Flood Disaster Relief Nov 2005 
– Nov 
2006 
100 9,992 people in 
Sampang district and 




Typhoon Disaster Relief  Jul 2006 – 
Dec 2006 
930.24 154,500 households in 
Leyte, Cebu, Davao 
and Manila City 
Cambodia Flood Disaster Relief 
and Poverty Alleviation 
Jul 2007 – 
Jan 2008 
379.76 11,798 households in 
Kampong Thom, 
Ratanakiri, Kandal, 
Kompong Chhnang and 
Takeo provinces 
Indonesia Flood Disaster Relief Mar 2008 
– May 
2009 
186.5 18,182 households in 
Central Java and East 
Java 
Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Relief  Nov 2008 
– Jan 
2009 
164 13,120 people in 




Typhoon Disaster Relief  Nov 2009 
– Feb 
2010 
520 7,137 households in 
Metro Manila and 
Ifugao provinces 
 Lao PDR Typhoon Disaster Relief  Jul 2010 – 
Oct 2010 
347 9,207 villages in 
Saravan and Attapeu 
provinces 
Thailand Flood Disaster Relief Nov 2011 
– Dec 
2011 
50 8,100 households in 
Central region (31,000 
cans of cooked rice) 
Indonesia Poverty Alleviation  Oct 2012 
– Dec 
2012 
200 20,000 households in 
Yogyakarta, Central 
Java, Banten and East 
Java provinces 
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